Insights from experimental research in the behavioural sciences offer a powerful impetus to reject the new paternalist approach to social policy. The findings from psychology, behavioural economics and behavioural finance, concerning decision-making by people experiencing poverty, point to the importance of alleviating material hardship by improving the social safety net, rather than trying to remedy the character of individuals through welfare conditionality. Thus far, the behavioural sciences' usefulness as an intellectual weapon against punitive welfare reform has been underappreciated. This is partly due to underappreciation of the considerable contrast between the libertarian paternalism advocated by some behavioural scientists, which provides a rationale for governments to nudge citizens, and Lawrence Mead's new paternalism, which emphasises the personal responsibility of the poor for their circumstances. More importantly the disproportionate attention given to nudge has inhibited recognition that the behavioural research on poverty can be used to argue for more ambitious policy approaches which seek to transform behaviour in more ethical ways.

Around the world an expanding array of behavioural conditions are being attached to social security payments. This paper offers empirical evidence of the various moral frames used in the welfare conditionality debate, by its supporters and detractors. We systematically analyse the debates in

A paradox troubles the foundations of libertarian political thought. This paradox is the paradox of universal self-ownership and it arises from the interaction of two of the primary claims of libertarian political philosophers:(1) that all individuals are (at least originally) self-owners, 1 and (2) that all individuals own the products of their labour. Libertarians hold that these two claims are consistent with each other, and indeed that (2) can be derived from (1).

Internationally the payment of welfare benefits is increasingly being made conditional on recipients’ behaviour. Behavioural conditions and the payments to which they apply are diversifying. This article aims to contribute to the debate among scholars and policymakers over the ethics of welfare conditionality. While other assessments of the ethics of welfare conditionality have focused on the potential harm caused to vulnerable welfare recipients, this paper develops the argument that welfare conditionality is illiberal. Drawing on findings from behavioural science, it argues that relying on extrinsic motivation in the form of financial incentives is a less desirable approach to behavioural change than bolstering intrinsic motivation. The argument is illustrated with the case of the Australian ‘No Jab, No Pay’ policy, under which family payments and childcare subsidies are denied to parents whose children are not fully immunised. As behavioural conditions and the payments to which they are applied diversify, the cumulative effects of these conditions pose an underappreciated threat to citizens’ autonomy.