In this paper, we draw on common-pool resource theory to argue that indigenous territories, when granted full property rights, will be effective at curbing deforestation. Using satellite data, we test the effect of property rights on deforestation between 1982 and 2016. In order to identify causal effects, we combine a regression discontinuity design with the orthogonal timing of homologation. We find that observations inside territories with full property rights show a significant decrease in deforestation, while the effect does not exist in territories without full property rights. While these are local average treatment effects, our results suggest that not only do indigenous territories serve a human-rights role, but they are a cost-effective way for governments to preserve their forested areas. First, obtaining full property rights is crucial to recognize indigenous peoples’ original right to land and protect their territories from illegal deforestation. Second, when implemented, indigenous property rights reduce deforestation inside indigenous territories in the Amazon rainforest, and could provide an important positive externality for Brazil and the rest of the world in terms of climate change mitigation.

We propose a methodology for defining urban markets based on built-up land-cover classified from daytime satellite imagery. Compared to markets defined using minimum thresholds for nighttime light intensity, daytime imagery identify an order of magnitude more markets, capture more of India's urban population, are more realistically jagged in shape, and reveal more variation in the spatial distribution of economic activity. We conclude that daytime satellite data are a promising source for the study of urban forms.

Oil royalties provide a substantial but volatile inflow of non tax-payer money to municipal coffers. While a large literature examines the impact of oil on democratic emergence and stability, I examine how oil impacts corruption and the types of candidates elected under democracy. To predict the effects of oil royalties, I develop a formal model with moral hazard, adverse selection and endogenous entry. I show that natural resource windfalls generate the strategic entry of corrupt candidates and prevent voters from distinguishing politicians' integrity, creating cycles of corruption and reelection. I test this theory in Brazil, where offshore royalties are determined and allocated exogenously based on a geographic rule and the international price of oil. Consistent with the model, I find that a one standard deviation increase in oil royalties produces a 29% increase in corruption. The effects of windfalls on corruption are larger after elections during booms and lower during busts. Furthermore, oil royalties lead to a reelection cycle: when the price of oil is expected to be higher, incumbents are reelected more often than when the price of oil is expected to fall, independent of economic and individual level variables. I show that strategic entry of corrupt candidates during booms is likely the cause of these corruption and reelection cycles, as predicted by the theory. Taken together, these results point to a strong effect of oil royalties on local level corruption and electoral outcomes.

Forests serve a crucial role in our fight against climate change. Secondary forests provide important potential for conservation of biodiversity and climate change mitigation. In this paper, we explore whether collective property rights in the form of indigenous territories (ITs) lead to higher rates of secondary forest growth in previously deforested areas. We exploit the timing of granting of property rights, the geographic boundaries of ITs and two different methods, regression discontinuity design and difference-in-difference, to recover causal estimates. We find strong evidence that indigenous territories with secure tenure not only reduce deforestation inside their lands but also lead to higher secondary forest growth on previously deforested areas. After receiving full property rights, land inside ITs displayed higher secondary forest growth than land outside ITs, with an estimated effect of 5% using our main RDD specification, and 2.21% using our difference-in-difference research design. Furthermore, we estimate that the average age of secondary forests was 2.2 y older inside ITs with secure tenure using our main RDD specification, and 2.8 y older when using our difference-in-difference research design. Together, these findings provide evidence for the role that collective property rights can play in the push to restore forest ecosystems.