This article explores cannabis regulation in Canada and the United States and examines how recent legalization efforts have manifested differently in each country. Although some of these differences are explained by uncompromising constitutional structures, this comparative exercise examines each system's political choices. While emphasis is placed on the Canadian experience, this article seeks to inform and enhance policy and regulation in both countries in addition to highlighting inherent ethical issues.

In 2014, New Jersey passed the Sports Wagering Act, permitting sports betting at state casino and racetrack venues, in direct conflict with the federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act. In 2017, South Dakota passed Senate Bill 106, requiring that certain e-commerce retailers collect and remit sales tax, in violation of federal law. The two U.S. Supreme Court decisions arising from challenges to these state statutes-South Dakota v. Wayfair and Murphy v. NCAA-exemplify U.S. Supreme Court "case baiting." Case baiting is a tactic states implement to challenge federal directives by passing state legislation that directly conflicts with federal law to lure the Court into granting certiorari and ruling in their favor. This article argues that South Dakota's and New Jersey's triumphs pave the way for other jurisdictions to pursue similar strategies across multiple legal issues such as abortion restrictions and immigration law. In addition, this article suggests that case baiting invites further scholarly exploration of important policy considerations, including the use of this tactic as a novel approach to the application of law and strategy, whether case baiting promotes the Court's progression toward a more quasi-legislative role, and whether passing conflict legislation violates state legislators' oaths of office.

States are engaging in brute force (anti) federalism, where both sides of the political spectrum push agendas that extend beyond the Founder's early ideal of balanced federalism, using popular support and special interest groups' interests as their springboard. These trial‐and‐error tactics increase vertical and interstate horizontal frictions, create political and economic challenges for businesses, and increase American polarization. However, they also allow states the opportunity to force an increasingly stalemated federal government into action. This article introduces the concept of brute force (anti) federalism by first examining the evolution of modern federalism. It then offers a sampling of state brute force efforts, analyzes the effect of popular momentum and special interest groups on state political activity, advances broad‐based perspectives surrounding brute force (anti) federalism, and poses additional questions to be considered.