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ABSTRACT. In this paper we consider persuasion in the context of practical reasoning, and discuss the problems associated with construing reasoning about actions in a manner similar to reasoning about beliefs. We propose a perspective on practical reasoning as presumptive justification of a course of action, along with critical questions of this justification, building on the account of Walton. From this perspective, we articulate an interaction protocol, which we call PARMA, for dialogues over proposed actions based on this theory. We outline an axiomatic semantics for the PARMA Protocol, and discuss two implementations which use this protocol to mediate a discussion between humans. We then show how our proposal can be made computational within the framework of agents based on the Belief-Desire-Intention model, and illustrate this proposal with an example debate within a multi agent system.

The field of computational models of argument is emerging as an important aspect of artificial intelligence research. The reason for this is based on the recognition that if we are to develop robust intelligent systems, then it is imperative that they can handle incomplete and inconsistent information in a way that somehow emulates the way humans tackle such a complex task. And one of the key ways that humans do this is to use argumentation -either internally, by evaluating arguments and counterarguments -or externally, by for instance entering into a discussion or debate where arguments are exchanged. As we report in this review, recent developments in the field are leading to technology for artificial argumentation, in the legal, medical, and e-government domains, and interesting tools for argument mining, for debating technologies, and for argumentation solvers are emerging.

In this article we offer a formal account of reasoning with legal cases in terms of argumentation schemes. These schemes, and undercutting attacks associated with them, are formalized as defeasible rules of inference within the ASPIC+ framework. We begin by modelling the style of reasoning with cases developed by Aleven and Ashley in the CATO project, which describes cases using factors, and then extend the account to accommodate the dimensions used in Rissland and Ashley's earlier HYPO project. Some additional scope for argumentation is then identified and formalized.

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