In this work, we introduce two full functional identity-based authentication and key exchange (IDAKE) schemes for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Therefore, we utilize some special features of identity-based cryptographic (IBC) schemes, such as pre-shared secret keys from pairings and efficient key management, to design MANET-IDAKE schemes that meet the special constraints and requirements of MANETs. As part of these schemes, we present the first key revocation and key renewing algorithms for IBC schemes. The former algorithm uses a new concept of neighborhood watch. We introduce a basic MANET-IDAKE scheme in which a trusted third party (TTP) initializes all devices before they join the network and a fully self-organized MANET-IDAKE scheme that does not require any central TTP. The schemes bootstrap the security in MANETs and enable the use of authentication, key exchange, and other security protocols in a variety of applications. Furthermore, we present an extremely efficient yet secure IDAKE protocol that can be used in the presented schemes. Finally, we provide a security and performance discussion of the presented MANET-IDAKE schemes and IDAKE protocol.

Abstract. Recently, identity-based cryptographic (IBC) schemes have been considered to secure mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) due to their efficient key management properties. However, proposed schemes do not provide mechanisms for key revocation and key renewal. In this paper, we propose the first key revocation and key renewal mechanisms for IBC schemes that are especially designed for MANETs. In our fully self-organized revocation scheme, each node monitors nodes in communication range and securely propagates its observations. The public key of a node is revoked if a minimum number of nodes accused the node. To enable key renewal, we introduce a modified format for ID-based public keys, such that new keys can be issued for the same identity. The introduced revocation scheme is efficient because it uses pre-shared keys from the Weil pairing and messages are sent to an m-hop neighborhood instead to the entire network.

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is widely used as an authentication framework to control the access to wireless networks, e.g. in IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16 networks. In this paper, we discuss limitations of EAP security and demonstrate how these limitations can be exploited to launch attacks on existing EAP methods. In particular, we present a series of attacks which cause some standard security claims, namely channel binding, protected ciphersuite negotiation and cryptobinding, to fail and compromise the key exchange, authentication and privacy of EAP communications. Next, we identify the special security challenges of EAP systems that may cause the considered security claims to fail. EAP differs from other authentication frameworks as a two party protocol, like IKE and TLS, because it is conducted with three parties involved across two communication links with different media. Another security challenge of EAP is the negotiability of EAP methods, ciphersuites, and protocol versions. These challenges make it difficult to derive a trust model for EAP and to securely adopt existing protocols. Finally, we conclude with recommendations for more secure EAP implementations. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. not provide any physical protection. Without implementing any layer of security, adversaries can eavesdrop on wireless communications and unauthorized users can easily access the network. To prevent these and other attacks, wireless networks need to provide an access control mechanism that enables authentication of all wireless users who wish to access the network. The authentication needs to be mutual to prevent an adversary from masquerading as a wireless access point. Furthermore, a key management scheme is needed to establish keys that can be used to secure all communications over the wireless channel. Categories and Subject DescriptorsCurrently, the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in IETF RFC 3748 [13], has been adopted by a few wireless standards as an access authentication and key establishment protocol. For example, IEEE 802.11i [6] makes use of IEEE 802.1X [8], which relies on EAP for authentication. EAP is also an authentication option in IEEE 802.16e [9]. EAP is an authentication framework that defines message formats and flows to support different authentication methods, referred to as EAP methods in the remainder of this paper. There are currently more than 40 EAP methods, e.g. EAP-TLS [16], EAP-TTLS [4], and EAP-GPSK [3]. EAP was originally designed for the use with the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP). However, today EAP is widely used to control access to wireless networks and we limit our d...

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