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Deploying the theoretical framework of Italian Marxist thinker, Antonio Gramsci, this article argues that rather than a neo-colonial arrangement, the transfer of power from the British to locals in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana) could be conceptualized as a passive revolution. This passive revolution, which was triggered by demands for independence by radical nationalists, entailed the formation of a pro-British political party, the Botswana Democratic Party, and transferring power to it in a carefully managed decolonization process. The passive revolution aimed not just at preserving British economic interests in the protectorate but also at state formation for purposes of expanding the capitalist mode of production in the newly independent state. Thus, the transfer of power took place concurrently with the creation of a legitimate capitalist state that served the interests of both the British and the cattle-owning Botswana Democratic Party elite that assumed power at independence. Post-independence, the cattle bourgeois class at the apex of the Botswana Democratic Party embarked upon the construction of hegemony through the creation of an interventionist developmental state that addressed the narrow interests of other classes and groups constituting the post-independence historical bloc. Such hegemony has allowed the Botswana Democratic Party to retain power to the present day.

Given that Botswana is considered a stable democracy, the need for democracy assistance does not at first glance seem necessary. Yet, democracy assistance is an important feature of Botswana’s political regime. The rationale for democracy assistance is couched in terms of strengthening the country’s democratic institutions, enhancing the state’s capacity, and bolstering Botswana’s civil society. However, contrary to these stated objectives, this article reveals that democracy assistance serves the agenda of Western donor countries and certain multilateral institutions—an agenda concerned with keeping Botswana politically stable and its state institutions efficient so that the country is attractive to investors. This agenda is pursued at the cost of not making certain long overdue political reforms.

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