Aiming at the competition and cooperation decision-making problem between two ports in the same regional port group, this paper studies four kinds of dynamic game scenarios of two adjacent ports—namely, independent strategy–independent strategy (i.e., DD combinations), independent strategy–integrated strategy (i.e., DT combinations), integrated strategy–independent strategy (i.e., TD combinations), and integrated strategy–integrated strategy (i.e., TT combinations). By introducing port demand models and using the dynamic game method, the paper performs a comparative study of port service pricing, port demand, and port profit in different combinations of competition and cooperation. The results show that taking port profit as payment function, the equilibrium strategy of the leader port is the independent strategy, which is also the dominant strategy, while the independent strategy or integrated strategy of the follower port depends on the degree of service substitution provided by the two competing ports. When the degree of service substitution is low (0 < γ < 0.53), the equilibrium strategies of two competing ports are the DD combinations, but the equilibrium strategies can be improved by Pareto, and further analysis shows that TT combinations are the Pareto equilibrium strategies at this time. By contrast, when the degree of service substitution provided by the two competing ports is high (0.53 ≤γ < 1), the DT combinations are the equilibrium strategies of the two competing ports, which are also the Pareto equilibrium strategies at this time. The research shows that when the degree of service substitution of the two ports is low, to encourage the two ports to carry out differentiated development of service functions, it is conducive to promote the two ports to adopt the integrated cooperation strategies.

The study considers the competition and cooperation between mixed duopoly ports with service differentiation when both emission tax and partial privatization policies are implemented together. By developing three-game models between government and port enterprises, this paper first studies and compares, under different game scenarios, the optimal emission tax for mixed duopoly ports and privatization level for a semipublic port, as well as the optimal output (or pricing) and emission reduction of semipublic and private ports. Moreover, the profit and utility of the two ports, environment damage, consumer surplus, and social welfare are also compared, and the impacts of technology spillover for emission reduction and service differentiation on the decision-making of the government and port enterprises are discussed. We find that the optimal emission tax under a strategic cooperation scenario can reach a higher level, then the government needs more efforts to protect the environment. In addition, although port cooperation is conducive to maximizing social welfare and increasing port throughput, it harms the profitability of the two ports.

Port emission reduction (PER) has attracted more and more attention, and promoting PER involves multiple stakeholders. Therefore, based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, port enterprise, and port residents, to explore the key variables affecting the implementation of emission reduction measures by the port enterprise. It is found that, in the initial stage of PER, because of the huge emission reduction cost, the government’s incentive policies and the potential losses brought by port residents’ supervision are the driving forces to promote the port enterprises to implement emission reduction measures. In the intermediate stage and mature stage of the development of PER, with the development of emission reduction technology, the emission reduction cost of port enterprises will be reduced, and the incremental income after emission reduction will gradually make up for part of the input cost. At this time, the government can reduce or even cancel relevant subsidies and finally withdraw from the market, and the willingness of port residents to choose supervision will be reduced, then the whole tripartite evolutionary game has reached an evolutionary stable state. In addition, we also provide some management insights for policymakers based on the results of sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters affecting the evolution path of the tripartite game.

Pollution emissions caused by maritime port activities have attracted increasing attention. To promote cleaner production in port enterprises, based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model involving central government, local governments, and port enterprises by analyzing the conflicts of interest among the main stakeholders. Examining the evolutionary game model, we found six combinations of evolutionary stabilization strategies in the system that promote cleaner production in port enterprises. Moreover, we conducted a sensitivity analysis on the relevant parameters of the system and identified the key parameters affecting the stability and equilibrium of the system. The results, from the perspective of interests, show that the cost of cleaner production, fines imposed and subsidies provided by local governments, and incremental benefits are the most significant parameters. In addition, simulation results support the idea that strengthening the risk appetite of port enterprises and local governments and the environmental preferences of local governments is conducive to prompting port enterprises to choose cleaner production more quickly. Finally, we also provide some management insights for policy makers based on the results of sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters affecting the evolution path of the tripartite game. This paper presents an analysis of practices and policies that may be applied to reduce pollution emissions and promote cleaner production in major port activities worldwide. Because China operates several of the world’s largest container ports, the paper mainly explores the Chinese system itself but also provides important insights that could inform improvements elsewhere.