ABSTRACT. This article argues that productive work represents a mode of human flourishing unfortunately neglected in much current political theorizing. Focusing on Habermasian critical theory, I contend that Habermas's dualist theory of society, with its underpinning distinction between communicative and instrumental reason, excludes work and the economy from ethical reflection. To avoid this uncritical turn, we need a concept of work that retains a core emancipatory referent. This, I claim, is provided by Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of Ôpractice'. The notion of Ôpractice' is significant in suggesting an alternative conception of human productivity that is neither purely instrumental nor purely communicative, but rather both simultaneously: a form of activity which issues in material products and yet presumes a community of workers engaged in intersubjective self-transformation. However, we can endorse MacIntyre's notion of Ôpractice' only if we reject his totalizing antimodernism and insist on the emancipatory potentialities of modern institutions.

This paper explores the republican case for worker voice in economic enterprises based on the ideal of freedom as non-domination, and assesses its merits relative to two influential arguments for workplace democratization grounded on freedom understood as autonomy and selfdetermination. Two claims are advanced. The first is that the republican case for worker voice avoids difficulties associated with these two arguments. The second, however, is that the ideal of non-domination is insufficient, that an adequate understanding and defence of workplace democracy will also have to make significant reference to freedom understood as autonomy.

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This paper explores the republican case for worker voice in economic enterprises based on the ideal of freedom as non-domination, and assesses its merits relative to two influential arguments for workplace democratization grounded on freedom understood as autonomy and selfdetermination. Two claims are advanced. The first is that the republican case for worker voice avoids difficulties associated with these two arguments. The second, however, is that the ideal of non-domination is insufficient, that an adequate understanding and defence of workplace democracy will also have to make significant reference to freedom understood as autonomy.

One value invoked in arguments for taking meaningful work seriously as an ethical aspiration, and for rearranging our working practices to accommodate this aspiration, is that of individual freedom. This appeal typically takes three forms. The first, drawing from an Aristotelian ideal of human flourishing, appeals to freedom conceived as self-realization. The second centers on freedom understood in the sense of personal autonomy or self-determination. The third appeals to freedom conceived as non-domination, which is deemed a precondition for enjoying self-realization and self-determination in work. These freedom-based claims for institutionalizing and maintaining meaningful work are compelling both in normative and empirical terms. Moreover, they are in no way undermined by counterclaims to the effect that meaningful work is not an appropriate public policy concern or that the ideals of self-realization and autonomy can be harnessed to legitimize exploitative work arrangements.