A previous study by Chen demonstrates a correlation between languages that grammatically mark future events and their speakers' propensity to save, even after controlling for numerous economic and demographic factors. The implication is that languages which grammatically distinguish the present and the future may bias their speakers to distinguish them psychologically, leading to less future-oriented decision making. However, Chen's original analysis assumed languages are independent. This neglects the fact that languages are related, causing correlations to appear stronger than is warranted (Galton's problem). In this paper, we test the robustness of Chen's correlations to corrections for the geographic and historical relatedness of languages. While the question seems simple, the answer is complex. In general, the statistical correlation between the two variables is weaker when controlling for relatedness. When applying the strictest tests for relatedness, and when data is not aggregated across individuals, the correlation is not significant. However, the correlation did remain reasonably robust under a number of tests. We argue that any claims of synchronic patterns between cultural variables should be tested for spurious correlations, with the kinds of approaches used in this paper. However, experiments or case-studies would be more fruitful avenues for future research on this specific topic, rather than further large-scale cross-cultural correlational studies.

In many markets, consumers visit stores and physically inspect products before making purchase decisions. We view the inspection of a product at a retail location as a search for product fit. We quantify the cost and benefit from searching for product fit using a discrete choice model of demand with optimal sequential search. In these models, the benefit of searching is measured by the standard deviation of the product fit and has, heretofore, been fixed to one in estimation. We show that, with an exogenous search cost shifter, both the cost and benefit of searching can be separately estimated. Our empirical setting is the U.S. automotive market. We assemble a unique data set containing individual-level smartphone geolocation data that inform us about dealership visits. We also obtain information on new vehicle purchases from proprietary DMV registration data. Our exogenous cost shifter is the distance a consumer must travel to visit a dealership. Our results show that the benefit provided by dealerships to consumers is substantial. Within our empirical context, failure to estimate the standard deviation of the product fit leads to biased search cost and consumer surplus estimates and to inaccurate predictions regarding consumers' number of searches and effects of at-home test drive programs.

Research Summary We examine the effect of face‐to‐face interactions between acquirers and targets before the acquisition announcements on acquisition returns. We argue that frequent interactions increase the target management's trust in the acquirer and benefit the acquirer by mitigating competition in the bidding process. For a sample of U.S. domestic acquisitions, we use smartphone geolocational data to measure the movement of people between merging companies in the months before the announcement. We find that with more frequent interactions, acquirers earn higher stock market returns at the announcement and targets receive fewer later bids from other bidders. Moreover, more frequent interactions are associated with lower returns to public targets vis‐à‐vis their acquirers. The effect of interactions is weaker when shareholder‐manager agency problems in the target are less severe. Managerial Summary Previous research shows that while acquisitions can create synergistic gains, the presence of potentially competing bidders forces acquirers to pay a high price for their targets, which makes acquisitions generally unprofitable for acquirers. We provide evidence suggesting that frequent social interactions between the acquirer's and the target's management in the pre‐acquisition phase increase the target management's trust in the acquirer, making it more willing to cede control to the acquirer and less eager to seek alternative bidders. By mitigating competition in the bidding process, social interactions make acquisitions more profitable for acquirers vis‐à‐vis targets. Social interactions are less effective when the target's management owns a larger share of the target or is better monitored by shareholders (e.g., in companies with concentrated ownership or private companies).

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