Recovery from serious mental illness has historically not been considered a likely or even possible outcome. However, a range of evidence suggests the courses of SMI are heterogeneous with recovery being the most likely outcome. One barrier to studying recovery in SMI is that recovery has been operationalized in divergent and seemingly incompatible ways: as an objective outcome versus a subjective process. Areas covered: This paper offers a review of recovery as a subjective process and recovery as an objective outcome; contrasts methodologies utilized by each approach to assess recovery; reports rates and correlates of recovery; and explores the relationship between objective and subjective forms of recovery. Expert commentary: There are two commonalities of approaching recovery as a subjective process and an objective outcome: (i) the need to make meaning out of one's experiences to engage in either type of recovery and (ii) there exist many threats to engaging in meaning making that may impact the likelihood of moving toward recovery. We offer four clinical implications that stem from these two commonalities within a divided approach to the concept of recovery from SMI.

Research using the integrated model of metacognition has suggested that the construct of metacognition could quantify the spectrum of activities that, if impaired, might cause many of the subjective disturbances found in psychosis. Research on social cognition and mentalizing in psychosis, however, has also pointed to underlying deficits in how persons make sense of their experience of themselves and others. To explore the question of whether metacognitive research in psychosis offers unique insight in the midst of these other two emerging fields, we have offered a review of the constructs and research from each field. Following that summary, we discuss ways in which research on metacognition may be distinguished from research on social cognition and mentalizing in three broad categories: (1) experimental procedures, (2) theoretical advances, and (3) clinical applications or indicated interventions. In terms of its research methods, we will describe how metacognition makes a unique contribution to understanding disturbances in how persons make sense of and interpret their own experiences within the flow of life. We will next discuss how metacognitive research in psychosis uniquely describes an architecture which when compromised – as often occurs in psychosis – results in the loss of persons’ sense of purpose, possibilities, place in the world and cohesiveness of self. Turning to clinical issues, we explore how metacognitive research offers an operational model of the architecture which if repaired or restored should promote the recovery of a coherent sense of self and others in psychosis. Finally, we discuss the concrete implications of this for recovery-oriented treatment for psychosis as well as the need for further research on the commonalities of these approaches.

It has been proposed that schizophrenia reflects disturbances in personal identity, which include sense of personal agency, sense of belonging within a social group, and metacognition. Less is known about how these different processes are related to one another and to well-being outcomes. To study this, we measured themes of agency and communion in narrative identity in 29 individuals with schizophrenia and 29 individuals with HIV. All participants had previously been assessed on metacognitive abilities using the Indiana Psychiatric Illness Interview (IPII) and completed scales measuring hopelessness and self-esteem. For the present study, themes of agency and communion were coded from the IPII transcripts. Results indicated that participants with schizophrenia had lower levels of agency and communion compared with participants with HIV. More presence of agency and communion themes were related to better metacognitive abilities as well as less hopelessness and higher self-esteem across groups. Agency predicted variance in hopelessness after controlling for metacognitive abilities. The results suggest that although the construction of narrative identity may depend on metacognitive abilities, agency themes predict outcomes beyond metacognition.

Many with psychosis experience substantial difficulties forming and maintaining social bonds leading to persistent social alienation and a lack of a sense of membership in a larger community. While it is clear that social impairments in psychosis cannot be fully explained by symptoms or other traditional features of psychosis, the antecedents of disturbances in social function remain poorly understood. One recent model has proposed that deficits in social cognition may be a root cause of social dysfunction. In this model social relationships become untenable among persons diagnosed with psychosis when deficits in social cognition result in inaccurate ideas of what others feel, think or desire. While there is evidence to support the influence of social cognition upon social function, there are substantial limitations to this point of view. Many with psychosis have social impairments but not significant deficits in social cognition. First person and clinical accounts of the phenomenology of psychosis also do not suggest that persons with psychosis commonly experience making mistakes when trying to understand others. They report instead that intersubjectivity, or the formation of an intimate shared understanding of thoughts and emotions with others, has become extraordinarily difficult. In this paper we explore how research in metacognition in psychosis can transcend these limitations and address some of the ways in which intersubjectivity and more broadly social function is compromised in psychosis. Specifically, research will be reviewed on the relationship between social cognitive abilities and social function in psychosis, including measurement strategies and limits to its explanatory power, in particular with regard to challenges to intersubjectivity. Next, we present research on the integrated model of metacognition in psychosis and its relation to social function. We then discuss how this model might go beyond social cognitive models of social dysfunction in psychosis by describing how compromises in intersubjectivity occur as metacognitive deficits leave persons without an integrated sense of others' purposes, relative positions in the world, possibilities and personal complexities. We suggest that while social cognitive deficits may leave persons with inaccurate ideas about others, metacognitive deficits leave persons ill equipped to make broader sense of the situations in which people interact and this is what leaves them without a holistic sense of the other and what makes it difficult to know others, share experiences, and sustain relationships. The potential of developing clinical interventions focused on metacognition for promoting social recovery will finally be explored.

The resistance of negative symptoms to pharmacologic treatment has spurred interest in understanding the psychological factors that contribute to their formation and persistence.Accordingly, recent research has suggested that deficits in metacognition, or the ability to form integrated ideas about oneself, others and the world, are involved in the development and maintenance of negative symptoms. One implication of this work is that treatments which address metacognition may effectively lead to reduction in negative symptoms. This paper explores the application of one such treatment, designed to address deficits in metacognition, Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT), to addressing persistent negative symptoms. First the basic principles of MERIT are presented and then its potential to address negative symptoms is illustrated by a comprehensive case report.