According to the extended conscious mind thesis (ECM), the physical basis of consciousness is not confined exclusively to the brain, but extends beyond it via sensorimotor dynamics. ECM is enjoying growing support among philosophers inspired by developments in enactive and embodied cognitive science. ECM has obvious parallels with the extended mind thesis (EM), according to which the physical basis of cognition is likewise not confined to the brain. However, EM's originator and most prominent defender, Andy Clark, argues that EM theorists can and should reject ECM, and offers an alternative internalist account, which admits a causal but non-constitutive role for sensorimotor dynamics. In this paper, I examine how well this claim fits with some of the key commitments of EM, and the implications for the EM theorist who wishes to deny ECM. I argue that Clark's position-ECM-rejecting EM-is untenable, and defend the ECM interpretation of sensorimotor dynamics.
Abstract. This paper draws on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy to sketch a phenomenological interpretation of sensorimotor understanding. I begin by situating Noë's enactive theory of vision in relation to Husserlian phenomenology. I then raise three related objections to Noë's treatment of sensorimotor understanding in terms of practical knowledge of possibilities for action. Finally, I appeal to Phenomenology of Perception to show how two of its major operative concepts -the 'body schema' and 'sedimentation' -can help to plug the gaps in Noë's account.
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