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This study conducts a comprehensive investigation into the investment value of sell-side analyst recommendation revisions in the UK, using a unique dataset from 1995 to 2013. Our rolling window analysis shows that, on average, upgrades fail to generate any significantly positive abnormal returns in any period of time, even before transaction costs. In addition, although downgrades could generate significantly negative abnormal gross returns over some periods of time, these observed significant returns disappear after accounting for transaction costs. Overall, our bootstrapping simulations confirm sell-side analysts' lack of skill in making valuable up/downward revisions to cover the size of transaction costs, irrespective of whether these revisions are made by high-ranking brokerage houses or not. However, an industry-based analysis shows that, within two high-tech industry sectors, i.e., Health Care and Technology sectors, sell-side analysts possess certain skill in making valuable downgrades over some periods of time and, in particular, such skill is sufficient to offset transaction costs.

This study investigates the selectivity and timing performance of a large sample (79) of UK investment trusts over a long period (15 years) by applying a number of models. There are few studies in this area in the UK. It is often argued that investors hold investment trust shares to obtain diversification and managerial skills. Managerial skill, if present, should be observed in the form of superior selectivity and timing performance measures. The general decline in the level of discount observed in the industry over the sample period suggests that excess returns could be obtained by holding investment trusts shares. We use single index and multifactor models for the analysis. Positive but statistically insignificant, selectivity estimates and negative, and at times significant, timing estimates are observed. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999.

This paper analyzes the market reaction towards capital structure adjustment through seasoned equity offerings in the United States. It recognizes that capital structure and equity mispricing are closely associated with seasoned equity offering. We specifically propose that if the trade‐off theory holds and firms follow target capital structures, then, firms that are overlevered would effectively exploit an overvalued equity in a cost‐effective adjustment of their capital structures through seasoned equity offerings. We also test how the market then reacts to such capital structure adjustment attempts. Controlling for other motives of seasoned equity offerings in a sample of 1,725 secondary issues by 1,016 U.S. nonfinancial firms from 2004 to 2013, we found that firms that were ex ante overlevered and overvalued were more likely to announce a seasoned equity offering. As regards the market reaction to such capital structure adjustments, it is found that the market favorably reacted in both the short term and long term, as evidenced by positive 3‐day cumulative abnormal returns and buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns, respectively. Moreover, post‐event evidence suggests that on the average, overlevered firms reduced their deviations from the target and that their leverage levels mainly stayed around the targets until at least 3 years after the secondary equity issues.