The concept and use of choice architecture in public policy arouses warranted suspicion among scholars and the general public. Liberal scholars fear that without limitations, the contemporary wave of nudge theory and policies threaten individual autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the use of choice architecture in particular policy areas can not only enhance individual autonomy, but also work to mitigate larger social inequalities. Research demonstrates that too much choice leads to ‘choice paralysis’, especially in instances where knowledge is low and stakes are high. By limiting and nudging choices in these contexts, individuals are likely to feel less overwhelmed and more in control. A stronger sense of control and additional resources elevates the experience of autonomy felt by vulnerable populations (those with low knowledge and resources). This paper offers a theoretically robust defense of choice architecture by examining the relationship between choice architecture and autonomy.

Rousseau’s passionate attack on inequalities political, social, and economic, his critique of reigning governments in the name of democracy, and his questioning of the authority of science or philosophy in defense of moral virtue shook the century of Enlightenment and the aftershocks are still felt today. We examine a neglected but important writing in which he first brings together his diverse but interrelated preoccupations: the Observations, his lengthiest defense of the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts. We analyze the argument in the Observations regarding the causes of moral corruption, taking our cue in part from several structural anomalies. These textual anomalies reveal two causal arguments: first, a political argument identifying inequality as the first cause of corruption, and, second, an argument about the corrupting effects of philosophy on religious faith and popular morality related to the first argument through a common concern with pride and inequality.