We sometimes say our moral claims are ''objectively true,'' or are ''right, even if nobody believes it.'' These additional claims are often taken to be staking out metaethical positions, representative of a certain kind of theorizing about morality that ''steps outside'' the practice in order to comment on its status. Ronald Dworkin has argued that skepticism about these claims so understood is not tenable because it is impossible to step outside such practices. I show that externally skeptical metaethical theory can withstand his attacks, thereby defending the possibility of this kind of metatheoretical method and showing that the additional objectivity claims still make sense as external claims. Four interpretations of the additional objectivity claims can still be understood externally: as secondary properties, as arguing for some form of causal correspondence, as explaining error, and under Blackburn's expressivism. In the end, Dworkin's argument can be turned against itself.

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Seeing law as an artifact might raise concerns about a metaphysical clash between this view and one in which law is described as a practice. Many have argued that seeing law as an artifact is compatible with, or even demanded by, H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism, in which law is based on a practice theory rule (and which this chapter shows to fit nicely with Raimo Tuomela’s understanding of social practices). However, Scott Shapiro has attacked Hart’s view for committing a category mistake, claiming rules and practices are ontologically distinct. Seeing law as a kind of artifact helps to show how practices can be normative in that artifacts come bundled with (weak) norms of usage and (stronger) norms of recognition. Lingering doubts about seeing law as a kind of artifact are addressed in this chapter by understanding its institutional nature.

This is a canvass to the critical reaction to Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority, as well as\ud actual or possible replies by Raz. Familiarity is assumed with the theory itself, covered in a previous\ud article. The article focuses primarily on direct criticisms of Raz’s theory, rather than replies\ud developed in the context of a theorist’s wider project