Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a major mental disorder in children. Presently, its pathogenesis and treatment as well as its role in adult psychiatry are subjects of heated debate. As early as 1846, the typical symptoms of ADHD were described by Heinrich Hoffmann, a physician who later founded the first mental hospital in Frankfurt. Interestingly, his description was published in a children's book entitled "Struwwelpeter" which he had designed for his 3-year-old son Carl Philipp. The symptomatology is impressively depicted in the colourfully illustrated story of "Zappel-Philipp" ("Fidgety Philip"), probably the first written mention of ADHD by a medical professional. This clearly shows that the diagnosis of ADHD is not an "invention" of modern times.

From a naturalistic perspective on mental illness, depression is often described in terms of biological dysfunctions, while a normative perspective emphasizes the lived experience of depression as a harmful condition. The paper relates a conceptual analysis of “depressive situation” to an analysis of the lived experience of depression. As such, it predominantly aims to specify depression as a harmful condition in lights of normative perspective on mental disorder, but partially refers to empirical research, i.e., naturalistic perspective on depression, to exemplarily stress on the methodological merits and limits of relating phenomenological considerations closer to empirical research. The depressive situation is further specified with an examination of the evaluative dynamics by which individuals meaningfully relate to themselves, others and the world. These evaluative dynamics emerge out of the interplay of pre-reflective and reflective processes, which are significantly altered in depression. Such alterations of the evaluative structure are inextricably intertwined with significant distortions of practical sense in depression. From a phenomenological perspective, these distortions of practical sense show in characteristic experiences of evaluative incoherence and impairments of agency. Finally, this paper focuses on an examination of “evaluative incapacity,” which has the integrative potential to capture a range of typical changes of meaningful relatedness that determine the depressive situation.

The goal of this paper is to give an account of typical changes of existential and atmospheric feelings in depressive comportment . It seems quite obvious that patterns of depressive experience and behavior differ in many respects from ‘normal’ patterns of encounters with the world. Although these patterns are manifested by a variety of surface behaviors, our interest lies rather in the general structure that underlies depressive comportment (here, particularly as it is expressed by more specific experiences, evaluative patterns, and behaviors). To understand how severe the changes are that are characteristic of depressive comportment, we first introduce a structure that implicitly underlies most of our encounters with the world, namely affective intentionality . The concept of affective intentionality captures the experiential unity of phenomenality and intentionality, as well as the bodily aspects, which are expressed in human comportments. To develop, eventually, in more detail how depressive comportment differs from nondepressive comportments, we provide a detailed analysis of narratives found in autobiographical reports of depressed persons published over the last 40 years. We also take into account responses to an online survey that was conducted as part of a philosophical study of depression at the University of Durham with the support of SANE, London. The analysis unfolds along the dimensions of both elementary and non-elementary existential feelings, as well as atmospheric feelings.

In this paper, I distinguish three different levels for describing, and three corresponding ways for understanding, deficient empathy as the core of NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder). On the macro level, deficient empathy can be explained as disturbed interpersonal functioning, and is understood as lack of recognition. On the meso-level, deficient empathy can be described as psychic disintegration, and can be understood specifically in its dissocial aspects. Psychic disintegration in NPD correlates with somatic changes, i.e., dysfunctional affective empathy and mind-reading on the micro level of description, which is the third level. The “core-deficit-model of NPD” that I outline, while not rejecting reductionist approaches outright, argues in favor of integrating (top-down/bottom-up) functionalist descriptions of empathy into a wider conceptual framework of bio-psycho-social functioning. The “core-deficit-model of NPD” is interdisciplinary, can bypass monodisciplinary skepticism, and removes purported barriers between explaining and understanding the “lack” of empathy as the core of pathological narcissism.