This article addresses the micro-analytic foundations of illiquidity and price dynamics in the real estate market by integrating modern portfolio theory with models describing the real estate transaction process. Based on the notion that real estate is a heterogeneous good that is traded in decentralized markets and that transactions in these markets are often characterized by costly searches, we argue that the most important aspects defining real estate illiquidity in both residential and commercial markets are the time required for sale and the uncertainty of the marketing period. These aspects provide two sources of bias in the commonly adopted methods of real estate valuation, which are based solely on the prices of sold properties and implicitly assume immediate execution. We demonstrate that estimated returns must be biased upward and risks downward. These biases can be significant, especially when the marketing period is highly uncertain relative to the holding period. We also find that real estate risk is closely related to investors' time horizons, specifically that real estate risk decreases when the holding period increases. These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that real estate is more favorable to long-term investors than to short-term investors. They also provide a theoretical foundation for the recent econometric literature, which finds evidence of smoothing of real estate returns. Our findings help explain the apparent risk-premium puzzle in real estate-that is, that ex post returns appear too high, given their apparent low volatility-and can lead to the formal derivation of adjustments that can define real estate's proper role in the mixed-asset portfolio. The Risk-Premium Puzzle in Real EstateProper pricing, evaluation of investment performance and allocation of real estate in a mixed-asset portfolio have persisted as vexing research issues. Real estate is highly heterogeneous, thinly traded over relatively long holding periods and traded through a transactions process that is typically not a simultaneous bid auction but instead is a sequential bid process without recall, which may involve significant transaction costs. Thus, it displays characteristics of illiquidity, but a type of illiquidity that may depart from that displayed by thinly traded securities. * Fannie Mae, Washington DC 20016 or len lin@fanniemae.com.

This paper makes a preliminary attempt to evaluate empirically the nature of the contribution of architectural quality to the value of buildings. An economic model is postulated that predicts equilibrium rent and vacancy behavior as a function of both design and non-design characteristics. Vacancies are created in equilibrium as a result of search and information costs and tenant heterogeneity and are observed by the landlord as price-inelastic demand behavior. Design quality is seen to influence both rent and vacancy behavior. Its effect, however, is dependent on characteristics both of the production and operating cost functions and of tenant demand for the design vs. non-design amenity. An important characteristic of the design amenity is that it is not, in general, independent of the production function for non-design amenities. The model is tested using disaggregate cross-sectional and longitudinal operating performance and amenity data from a set of 102 class A office buildings in Boston and Cambridge. Data on design quality for the set of buildings were provided by a detailed evaluation of each structure by a panel of architects. Results confirm a strong influence of design on rents; structures rated in the top 20% for design quality were predicted to extract almost 22% higher rents than those rated in the bottom 20%. In contrast, the data showed a weak relationship between vacancy behavior and design quality. Finally, good design was shown to cost more to produce on average, but not necessarily in every case. The magnitude of the point estimates of the rent, vacancy, and construction cost effects suggest that good design may not in fact be more profitable on average, but as with a lottery, may provide a small probability of a high return to the developer. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

This paper examines the theory of commercial mortgage default and tests it using a data set of 2,899 loan histories provided by a major multi-line insurance company. A default model is estimated which relates subsequent default incidence and timing to contemporaneous loan term, borrower, property and economic/market conditions. Maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate a hazard function predicting conditional probability of default over time. Results confirm many expected default relationships, in particular the dominance of loan terms and property value trends over time in affecting default. The effectiveness of the model in discriminating between "good" and "bad" loans is explored. Implications for underwriting practice and credit risk diversification are noted. Finally, suggestions are made for extending these results in pricing applications. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

This paper addresses, theoretically and empirically, the structure of influences affecting the default option in mortgage contracts. A formal theoretical model recognizes that a number of loan and non-loan related effects beyond equity in the unit could influence the default decision. These include 1) payment levels relative to income, which could displace other investment opportunities or cause a need for borrowing or sale to meet mortgage obligations; 2) current and expected neighborhood and housing market conditions, in particular the expected relative rate of appreciation of the unit and the relative cost of homeownership; 3) economic conditions; 4) wealth; 5) borrower characteristics proxying for variability in income or "crisis" events; as well as 6) transactions costs incurred upon default. Estimates of the model making use of a micro-level sample of individual loan histories over a twelve year period, supplemented by longitudinal census and economic information, find a number of these "other" effects important. Simulations find several of them to dominate the equity effect on default and to help explain why some households with zero or negative equity may not default, while others with positive equity may. The implications of these results for appropriate specification of the pricing model describing the default option and for appropriate underwriting of AMIs are noted. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

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