Organisations increasingly adopt tracking technologies that allow managers to continuously collect highly detailed records of employee, performance, and health. On the basis of the theory of planned behaviour, we aim to identify attitudes, functions of monitoring, and control perceptions that should strengthen or lower employees' acceptance of these technologies. Our experimental vignette study among 800 respondents in Germany reveals that acceptance is more likely if employees have positive attitudes towards surveillance in general and towards monitoring in private life and if the technologies enhance labour productivity. The tendency to reject the technology increases if it is to be used for monitoring health and performance. The results indicate that these new technologies will not be accepted unconditionally and may be subject to bargaining and conflicts. In the implementation process, human resources departments will have to take account of employee interests and well‐being, which in turn may improve acceptance and performance.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Collusive Tax Evasion and Social Norms Abstract Although collusive tax evasion by buyers and sellers of commodities and also by employers and employees is widespread all over the world, it has rarely been analyzed in the tax evasion literature. To fill this gap and to compare collusive tax evasion with independent tax evasion, this paper develops a simple non-cooperative game-theoretic model and confirms the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment. Because collusive tax evasion involves social interaction, this paper focuses on the effect of social norms and theoretically and empirically demonstrates that the tax compliance norm has a stronger negative effect on the magnitude of collusive tax evasion than on independent tax evasion. The reason for this result is that in a collusive tax evasion game with multiple equilibria social norms act as an equilibrium selection device, whereas social norms need to be internalized to change the behavior of taxpayers who evade taxes unobservedly. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: H260, A130.

Inheritance taxation divides public opinion and is among the most unpopular taxes in many countries, although only a minority of people have to pay it. Using a survey experiment with vignettes on a sample of German citizens (N=479), we examine attitudes towards inheritance taxation. Our results reveal several relevant dimensions for a proposed fair inheritance tax rate (PITR): The PITR decreases with a close relationship between testator and heir and when the asset is a family-occupied house or family enterprise compared with a "lump sum". It increases with the value of bequest and income of the heir representing equity considerations. Respondents advocate higher tax rates to reduce fiscal budget deficits. Respondents with a strong family orientation propose a low inheritance tax rate.

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