We say that a student scores at the th quantile of a standardized exam if he performs better than the proportion of the reference group of students and worse than the proportion (1-). Thus, half of students perform better than the median student and half perform worse. Similarly, the quartiles divide the population into four segments with equal proportions of the reference population in each segment. The quintiles divide the population into five parts; the deciles into ten parts. The quantiles, or percentiles, or occasionally fractiles, refer to the general case. Quantile regression as introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) seeks to extend these ideas to the estimation of conditional quantile functions-models in which quantiles of the conditional distribution of the response variable are expressed as functions of observed covariates.In Figure 1, we illustrate one approach to this task based on Tukey's boxplot (as in McGill, Tukey and Larsen, 1978). Annual compensation for the chief executive officer (CEO) is plotted as a function of firm's market value of equity. A sample of 1,660 firms was split into ten groups of equal size according to their market capitalization. For each group of 166 firms, we compute the three quartiles of CEO compensation: salary, bonus and other compensation, including stock options (as valued by the Black-Scholes formula at the time of the grant). For each group, the bow-tie-like box represents the middle half of the salary distribution lying between the first and third quartiles. The horizontal line near the middle of each box represents the median compensation for each group of CEOs, and the y

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Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO-the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions in America's largest companies. CEOs who lead interlocked firms earn significantly higher compensation. Also, interlocked CEOs tend to head larger firms. After controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the pay gap is reduced dramatically. However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented business relationships are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%. There also is evidence that the return to interlock was higher in the 1970s than in the early 1990s. AbstractIs executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO-the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions in America's largest companies. CEOs who lead interlocked firms earn significantly higher compensation. Also, interlocked CEOs tend to head larger firms. After controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the pay gap is reduced dramatically. However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented business relationships are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%. There also is evidence that the return to interlock was higher in the 1970s than in the early 1990s.

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This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using panel data from tax returns of the organizations from 1992 to 1996. Studying managers in nonprofits is particularly interesting given the difficulty in measuring performance. The article examines many areas commonly studied in the executive pay (within for‐profit firms) literature. It explores pay differences between for‐profit and nonprofit firms,pay variability within and across nonprofit industries, managerial pay and performance (including organization size and fund raising) in nonprofits, the effect of government grants on managerial pay, and the relationship between boards of directors and managerial pay in nonprofits.