This book addresses two questions that are crucial to understanding Mexico's current economic and political challenges. Why did the opening up of the economy to foreign trade and investment not result in sustained economic growth? Why has electoral democracy not produced rule of law? The answer to those questions lies in the ways in which Mexico's long history with authoritarian government shaped its judicial, taxation, and property rights institutions. These institutions, the authors argue, cannot be reformed with the stroke of a pen. Moreover, they represent powerful constraints on the ability of the Mexican government to fund welfare-enhancing reforms, on the ability of firms and households to write contracts, and on the ability of citizens to enforce their basic rights.

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The publication of Knight and Pansters's (2005) Caciquismo in Twentieth-Century Mexico (2005) renewed a debate about the significance of caciquismo [boss rule] in Mexican politics that has spanned more than five decades. The volume's immediate goal was to extend and deepen earlier historical studies of caciquismo in post-revolutionary Mexico (especially Brading, 1980). The editors and contributing authors succeeded admirably in this task, shedding new light on the role of caciques 1 (local or regional bosses) in different regions, sectors and time periods. At the same time, their research raised important questions concerning the broader relationship between caciquismo and different kinds of political regime (authoritarianism versus democracy) and about the ways in which Mexico's slow, uneven process of democratisation has affected -and has been shaped by -instances of cacical domination.Caciquismo in Twentieth-Century Mexico thus contributed to broader, multidisciplinary exchanges about the scope and impact of democratisation in Mexico and, by extension, in Latin America more generally. Political scientists' and sociologists' interest in caciquismo peaked during the 1960s and 1970s when, for example, some analysts focused on local leaders as brokers or intermediaries in countries confronting challenges of national political integration (Chalmers, 1972: 110-111; Valenzuela, 1977: 155-68). At the time, many scholars viewed the phenomenon as a traditional, predominantly rural form of personalist domination that would disappear under the relentless, 'modernising' pressures of socio-economic change and rural-urban migration. Even those researchers who documented the presence of cacicazgos [instances of cacical rule, or political fiefdoms] in other contexts, particularly in urban squatter settlements, generally assumed that caciques would eventually be doomed to political extinction. And, with the gradual instauration of civilian democratic rule throughout the region after 1 The general literature on this topic includes prominent examples of female bosses (cacicas). However, for simplicity of expression this article employs the term only in its more common, masculine form. 411Kevin J. Middlebrook the late 1970s, many political scientists shifted their attention to more conventional political phenomena such as elections, political parties and the multiple challenges of democratic consolidation. More recently, however, some scholars have revisited related topics such as electoral clientelism and vote-buying (Auyero, 2001) -albeit sometimes in a more 'formal', mathematical fashion than their predecessors (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004;Stokes, 2005) -as part of a growing interest in informal institutions and their political significance (Lauth, 2000;Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Somewhat paradoxically, then, even those who apply formal methods to the study of contemporary Latin American politics pay at least indirect homage to the continuing importance of those quintessentially informal political operators, caciques...