We examine the ex-dividend day behavior in a unique setting where (1) there are neither taxes on dividends nor on capital gains, (2) stock prices have been decimalized, (3) dividends are distributed annually, and (4) we have data that enable us to examine bid-ask bounce effects. In this economy, any price decline that is smaller than the dividends cannot be attributed to taxes and price discreteness. Like previous studies, we find that the stock price drops by less than the amount of dividends and there is a significant positive ex-day return. By examining abnormal volumes around the ex-dividend day, we find no evidence of short-term trading. We are able to account for our results using market microstructure models. When the impact of market microstructure is taken into account, the ex-dividend drop is not significantly different from the value of the dividend paid.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance practices on cost efficiency and financial stability for a sample of Islamic and conventional banks. In the analysis, the author uses a set of corporate governance variables that include, the board size, board independence, director gender, board meetings, board attendance, board committees, chair independence and CEO characteristics. Design/methodology/approach The author uses corporate governance data of Islamic banks that is unique in this field. In the analysis, the author also uses stochastic frontier analysis and panel vector autoregression models to quantify long-run and short-run statistical relationships between the operational efficiency of Islamic Banks and corporate governance practices. Findings According to the results, Islamic and conventional banks exhibit important differences in the effects of corporate governance practices on cost efficiency and financial stability. Results show that with a blind general adoption of corporate governance practices, Islamic banks may suffer a loss in their value since the adoption of the third layer of binding practices, over and above the already existing ones, imposed by the Sharia Board and the Board of Directors, may lead to cumbersome business operations. This conclusion is of importance to Islamic Banks since they struggle to survive in a very competitive international environment. Practical implications The author believes that the results may be of a certain value to regulators, policymakers and managers of Islamic banks. Based on the results, the author postulate that Islamic banks should select carefully international corporate governance practices. Social implications Islamic banks should not adopt additional third layer of binding practices as that would result lower performance and instability that would be damaging for the economy Originality/value This study employs a unique sample of Islamic banks that includes corporate governance data hand collected. Our findings of the corporate governance impact on Islamic banks performance and stability are therefore unique in the literature.