Preschool-age children’s reasoning about the reliability of deceptive sources was investigated. Ninety 3- to 5-year-olds watched several trials in which an informant gave advice about the location of a hidden sticker. Informants were either helpers who were happy to give correct advice, or trickers who were happy to give incorrect advice. Three-year-olds tended to accept all advice from both helpers and trickers. Four-year-olds were more skeptical but showed no preference for advice from helpers over trickers, even though they differentiated between helpers and trickers on metacognitive measures. Five-year-olds systematically preferred advice from helpers. Selective trust was associated with children’s ability to make mental state inferences.

The ability of 3-and 4-year-old children to disregard advice from an overtly misleading informant was investigated across five studies (total n = 212). Previous studies have documented limitations in young children's ability to reject misleading advice. This study was designed to test the hypothesis that these limitations are primarily due to an inability to reject specific directions that are provided by others, rather than an inability to respond in a way that is opposite to what has been indicated by a cue. In Studies 1 through 4, a puppet identified as The Big Bad Wolf offered advice to participants about which of two boxes contained a hidden sticker. Regardless of the form the advice took, 3-year olds performed poorly by failing to systematically reject it. However, when participants in Study 5 believed they were responding to a mechanical cue rather than the advice of the Wolf, they were better able to reject misleading advice, and individual differences in performance on the primary task were systematically correlated with measures of executive function. Results are interpreted as providing support for the communicative intent hypothesis, which posits that children find it especially difficult to reject deceptive information that they perceive as being intentionally communicated by others.

This study investigated children's ability to distinguish between resource inequalities with individual versus structural origins. Children (3‐ to 8‐years‐old; N = 93) were presented with resource inequalities based on either recipients’ merit (individual factor) or gender (structural factor). Children were assessed on their expectations for others’ allocations, own allocations, reasoning, and evaluations of others’ allocations. Children perpetuated merit‐based inequalities and either rectified or allocated equally in response to gender‐based inequalities. Older, but not younger, children expected others to perpetuate both types of inequalities and differed in their evaluations and reasoning. Links between children's allocations and judgments were also found. Results reveal novel insights into children's developing consideration of the structural and individual factors leading to resource inequalities.

The present research investigated the nature of the inferences and decisions young children make about informants with a prior history of inaccuracies. Across three experiments, 3- and 4-year-olds (total N = 182) reacted to previously inaccurate informants who offered testimony in an object-labeling task. Of central interest was children's willingness to accept information provided by an inaccurate informant in different contexts of being alone, paired with an accurate informant, or paired with a novel (neutral) informant. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that when a previously inaccurate informant was alone and provided testimony that was not in conflict with the testimony of another informant, children systematically accepted the testimony of that informant. Experiment 3 showed that children accepted testimony from a neutral informant over an inaccurate informant when both provided information, but accepted testimony from an inaccurate informant rather than seeking information from an available neutral informant who did not automatically offer information. These results suggest that even though young children use prior history of accuracy to determine the relative reliability of informants, they are quite willing to trust the testimony of a single informant alone, regardless of whether that informant had previously been reliable.

Children's epistemic vigilance was examined for their reasoning about the intentions and outcomes of informants' past testimony. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, 5- and 6-year-olds witnessed informants offering advice based on the intent to help or deceive others about the location of hidden prizes, with the advice leading to positive or negative outcomes. Informants then suggested to the children where to search for hidden prizes. Children trusted informants who had previously tried to help others more than informants who had previously tried to deceive others, regardless of past outcome. In addition, children trusted informants with positive past outcomes more than informants with negative past outcomes, regardless of intention. By varying intention and outcome independently, this study revealed that when children are deciding whether to trust testimony, they take into account the informant's mental states but also give slightly greater weight to the informants' past outputs.