Geografiske skillelinjer ble igjen sentrale for norske velgere under Solberg-regjeringen. Slike politiske spenninger kan komme til uttrykk gjennom det vi kaller en geografisk bevissthet -et syn på geografisk fordeling av makt og ressurser, og verdien av å bo et sted. Ved å analysere unike surveydata, viser vi at velgerne og (lokal-) politikerne mer enn forvaltningsansatte har en rural geografisk bevissthet som inkluderer en oppfatning av maktasymmetri mellom sentrum og periferi, ønske om mer ressurser til distriktene i form av flere og mindre offentlige tjenestesteder og verdsettelse av at barn vokser opp i mer landlige omgivelser. Resultatene viser at det å bo mer sentralt og ha høyere utdanning reduserer sannsynligheten for å ha en rural geografisk bevissthet noe som forklarer en del av forskjellen vi ser mellom forvaltningsansatte og de to andre gruppene. Forvaltningsansattes lojalitet til regjeringen, sosialisering til rollen og endringer i kontaktmønsteret mellom forvaltningsnivåene kan vaere med å forklare den avstanden vi observerer. Med utgangspunkt i våre teoretiske diskusjoner og empiriske funn presenteres forslag til videre forskning på feltet.

How do politicians in emerging democracies subvert institutional reforms that are designed to improve accountability? Looking at patron-client relations within political parties, I present a strategy, partisan accountability, by which strong parties undermine accountability to citizens. At the national level, parties build patronage networks. Central party organizations use their power and resources to build political machines that extend to the local level. Leveraging these patronage networks, national politicians co-opt local politicians into being accountable to central party interests over their own constituents. I employ original subnational data from Bosnia and Herzegovina on party organization and mayoral recalls from 2005 to 2015. The analysis shows that strong parties initiate recalls to install loyal, co-partisan mayors rather than to sanction mayors for poor policy performance. This pattern demonstrates a strategy by which central party organizations in competitive democracies stifle subnational democratization to consolidate power.

Survey research has revealed that post-communist citizens are skeptical towards democracy. Despite a substantial body of literature that has researched the origins and determinants of these attitudes, consensus has not yet emerged. A major challenge has been to distinguish between individual support for democracy as an ideal political regime and satisfaction with the way democracy is practiced in one’s country. Using structural equation modeling with latent variables, we improve measurement validity and account for feedback effects to better understand the relationship between these attitudes. Consistent with our performance-based theory, we find that positive assessments of political performance drive normative support for democracy. The impact of satisfaction with democracy on democratic support suggests that we should not rush to view post-communist citizens' mindset as anomalous and inherently anti-democratic. Rather, post-communist skepticism of democracy might be generalized to contexts characterized by flawed implementation and unmet expectations of this form of government.

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Recent democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe challenges the optimism of two decades of scholarship on post-communist democratization. The most severe form of backsliding—state capture by ruling parties—has occurred in countries formerly regarded as paradigms of successful democratic transition. Despite research on different kinds of capture, little is known about the overall process by which political parties capture a state. In response, we develop a conceptual framework that identifies four interconnected strategies and corresponding tactics: (1) exploiting crises to advance political agendas, (2) deactivating controls to constrain oversight, (3) milking cash-cows to generate income, and (4) manipulating the political system to institutionalize rents. To demonstrate the analytical value of the framework, we compare how Fidesz in Hungary and VMRO-DPMNE in North Macedonia achieved a state of capture. Notwithstanding contextual differences, the analysis shows that the political parties of interest employed the same set of strategies.