Nonviolent resistance can be a powerful tool for ordinary civilians to transform their governments; however, not all nonviolent movements end in success and many ultimately escalate into violent conflicts. To understand this escalatory process, I begin with the premise that social movements are not unitary actors but a collection of groups with varied preferences on goals and tactics. I argue that escalation is likely when movements have violence-wielding groups among their varied factions, as these groups deal in violence, believe in its utility, and can make the strategic decision to engage in violence as needed. I argue this is particularly likely when the campaign fails to make progress using nonviolent channels, suggesting that nonviolent tactics will not be successful to achieve the group’s goals. Expectations are tested using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes data and the case of Algeria’s escalation from a nonviolent movement to brutal civil war, and results are generally supportive.

We examine the impact of governmental leadership changes on the civil war peace process. In line with the literature on leadership changes and interstate war, we argue that transitions can help overcome lags in the rational updating process, leading to negotiations and termination through negotiated settlements. However, while studies of interstate relations emphasize the role of “outsider” changes that produce new winning coalitions, we argue that owing to the critical nature of credible commitment problems within the civil war peace process, only “insider” changes can generate the benefits of leadership change while mitigating uncertainty generated by leadership turnover. Using existing and original data on changes in governmental leadership, we find support for our expectations. Leadership changes can produce conditions favorable to negotiations and settlements, but only changes from inside the existing regime should be encouraged to avoid prolonging the conflict.

Existing research has found that killing or capturing rebel group leaders can lead to the termination of civil wars. This paper considers the quality of those terminations, examining how wars end and whether this produces a lasting peace or only a temporary reprieve from violence. Decapitation is expected to weaken rebel groups, shifting the balance of power to the government; however, results suggest that killing or capturing a rebel group leader tends to produce termination through inactivity rather than outright government victories. Decapitation is also found to have no effect on the chances of civil war recurrence. This suggests that the removal of rebel group leaders is effective primarily as a short-term strategy that does not tend to generate a lasting peace.

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This chapter analyzes whether collective violence can be justifiable, whether violence might be the answer. To be sure, the adoption of violent tactics invites greater costs. There is a significant likelihood of being killed in an armed battle against the state, and research consistently shows that violent movements generate higher levels of repression than their nonviolent counterparts. However, nonviolence raises its own ethical dilemmas. This begs the question of whether nonviolent resistance is worth the short-term costs of repression, given that protesters have no weapons with which to resist state violence. Moreover, is it worth the potential long-term costs of failure? To unpack this dilemma, the chapter first considers why nonviolent action is presented as both the morally and strategically superior approach to achieve the movement's long-term goals. It then suggests that violence should not be a proactive strategy, but may be a tactic of last resort.