Humans are able to mentally adopt the spatial perspective of others and understand the world from their point of view. We propose that spatial perspective taking (SPT) could have developed from the physical alignment of perspectives. This would support the notion that others have put forward claiming that SPT is an embodied cognitive process. We investigated this issue by contrasting several accounts in terms of the assumed processes and the nature of the embodiment. In a series of four experiments we found substantial evidence that the transformations during SPT comprise large parts of the body schema, which we did not observe for object rotation. We further conclude that the embodiment of SPT is best conceptualised as the self-initiated emulation of a body movement, supporting the notion of endogenous motoric embodiment. Overall our results are much more in agreement with an 'embodied' transformation account than with the notion of sensorimotor interference. Finally we discuss our findings in terms of SPT as a possible evolutionary stepping stone towards more complex alignments of socio-cognitive perspectives.

Because of attentional limitations, the human visual system can process for awareness and response only a fraction of the input received. Lesion and functional imaging studies have identified frontal, temporal, and parietal areas as playing a major role in the attentional control of visual processing, but very little is known about how these areas interact to form a dynamic attentional network. We hypothesized that the network communicates by means of neural phase synchronization, and we used magnetoencephalography to study transient long-range interarea phase coupling in a well studied attentionally taxing dual-target task (attentional blink). Our results reveal that communication within the fronto-parieto-temporal attentional network proceeds via transient long-range phase synchronization in the beta band. Changes in synchronization reflect changes in the attentional demands of the task and are directly related to behavioral performance. Thus, we show how attentional limitations arise from the way in which the subsystems of the attentional network interact. T he human brain faces an inestimable task of reducing a potentially overloading amount of input into a manageable flow of information that reflects both the current needs of the organism and the external demands placed on it. This task is accomplished via a ubiquitous construct known as ''attention,'' whose mechanism, although well characterized behaviorally, is far from understood at the neurophysiological level. Whereas attempts to identify particular neural structures involved in the operation of attention have met with considerable success (1-5) and have resulted in the identification of frontal, parietal, and temporal regions, far less is known about the interaction among these structures in a way that can account for the task-dependent successes and failures of attention. The goal of the present research was, thus, to unravel the means by which the subsystems making up the human attentional network communicate and to relate the temporal dynamics of their communication to observed attentional limitations in humans.A prime candidate for communication among distributed systems in the human brain is neural synchronization (for review, see ref. 6). Indeed, a number of studies provide converging evidence that long-range interarea communication is related to synchronized oscillatory activity (refs. 7-14; for review, see ref. 15). To determine whether neural synchronization plays a role in attentional control, we placed humans in an attentionally demanding task and used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to track interarea communication by means of neural synchronization.In particular, we presented 10 healthy subjects with two visual target letters embedded in streams of 13 distractor letters, appearing at a rate of seven per second. The targets were separated in time by a single distractor. This condition leads to the ''attentional blink'' (AB), a well studied dual-task phenomenon showing the reduced ability to report the second of two targets when an interval Ͻ5...

We set out to distinguish level 1 (VPT-1) and level 2 (VPT-2) perspective taking with respect to the embodied nature of the underlying processes as well as to investigate their dependence or independence of response modality (motor vs. verbal). While VPT-1 reflects understanding of what lies within someone else's line of sight, VPT-2 involves mentally adopting someone else's spatial point of view. Perspective taking is a high-level conscious and deliberate mental transformation that is crucially placed at the convergence of perception, mental imagery, communication, and even theory of mind in the case of VPT-2. The differences between VPT-1 and VPT-2 mark a qualitative boundary between humans and apes, with the latter being capable of VPT-1 but not of VPT-2. However, our recent data showed that VPT-2 is best conceptualized as the deliberate simulation or emulation of a movement, thus underpinning its embodied origins. In the work presented here we compared VPT-2 to VPT-1 and found that VPT-1 is not at all, or very differently embodied. In a second experiment we replicated the qualitatively different patterns for VPT-1 and VPT-2 with verbal responses that employed spatial prepositions. We conclude that VPT-1 is the cognitive process that subserves verbal localizations using “in front” and “behind,” while VPT-2 subserves “left” and “right” from a perspective other than the egocentric. We further conclude that both processes are grounded and situated, but only VPT-2 is embodied in the form of a deliberate movement simulation that increases in mental effort with distance and incongruent proprioception. The differences in cognitive effort predict differences in the use of the associated prepositions. Our findings, therefore, shed light on the situated, grounded and embodied basis of spatial localizations and on the psychology of their use.

While some aspects of social processing are shared between humans and other species, some aspects are not. The former seems to apply to merely tracking another's visual perspective in the world (i.e., what a conspecific can or cannot perceive), while the latter applies to perspective taking in form of mentally "embodying" another's viewpoint. Our previous behavioural research had indicated that only perspective taking, but not tracking, relies on simulating a body schema rotation into another's viewpoint. In the current study we employed Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and revealed that this mechanism of mental body schema rotation is primarily linked to theta oscillations in a wider brain network of body-schema, somatosensory and motor-related areas, with the right posterior temporo-parietal junction (pTPJ) at its core. The latter was reflected by a convergence of theta oscillatory power in right pTPJ obtained by overlapping the separately localised effects of rotation demands (angular disparity effect), cognitive embodiment (posture congruence effect), and basic body schema involvement (posture relevance effect) during perspective taking in contrast to perspective tracking. In a subsequent experiment we interfered with right pTPJ processing using dual pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (dpTMS) and observed a significant reduction of embodied processing. We conclude that right TPJ is the crucial network hub for transforming the embodied self into another's viewpoint, body and/or mind, thus, substantiating how conflicting representations between self and other may be resolved and potentially highlighting the embodied origins of high-level social cognition in general.