This paper has attempted a new look at the course of the Tripoli-American War of 1801–5. The approach is, first, to avoid the beaten track and concentrate on the more obscure part of the story, namely, Tripoli's conduct of the war; and secondly, to attempt an explanation of Tripoli's success (or conversely America's failure) in a way that is different from the general American pattern. In this respect, emphasis has therefore been, not on the ineffectiveness of the American navy, but on three other important factors. These are: the moral and material support of the neighbouring Maghribi states for Tripoli's cause; the favourable international situation which helped Tripoli economically through the livestock trade with Malta; and thirdly, the contribution of Tripoli's navy, both as an instrument of warfare and as an economic asset. The paper concludes with an assessment of the international, dynastic, and political significance of the outcome of the war for Tripoli.

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