Since the mid-2000s, the Chinese government has promoted village modernization under the banner of “building a new socialist countryside.” To explain the origins and outcomes of this policy, this article examines the case of Ganzhou city in Jiangxi province. Ganzhou became a national model for rural development known for involving organizations called peasant councils in policy implementation. The study found that despite an initial emphasis on rural participation and moderate change, the new socialist countryside evolved into a top-down campaign to demolish and reconstruct villages. Three factors shaped this process: the strength of bureaucratic mobilization, the weakness of rural organizations, and shifting national policy priorities. After obtaining model status, Ganzhou's rural policy became more ambitious and politicized, leaving little space for participation. This insight suggests there are both benefits and costs to China's policy process. Despite the advantages of policy innovation, scaling up local experiments may actually undermine their success.

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This chapter discusses the role of rural institutions and state campaigns in development. Most accounts of rural development in East Asia privilege the role of land reform and the emergence of developmental states. However, this narrative is incomplete. A thorough examination of rural sector change in the region reveals the transformative effects of rural modernization campaigns, which can be defined as policies demanding high levels of bureaucratic and popular mobilization to overhaul traditional ways of life in the countryside. East Asian governments' use of campaigns runs counter to standard portrayals of the developmental state as wholly technocratic and demonstrates that rural development was not the inevitable result of industrialization. Rather, it was an intentional policy goal accomplished with techniques that aligned more with Maoism or Leninism than with market principles or careful economic management. The chapter begins by assessing common explanations for East Asian rural development in the post-World War II period. It then turns to the case of China and explores some of the reasons for rural policy failures in the Mao era (1949–1976) and successes in the reform era (1978–present). Finally, the chapter revisits the case of Japan and concludes with a few points about why existing theories of state-led development need to be reexamined.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the state and rural development in East Asia. In many developing countries, ruling elites pursue industrial development at the expense of the rural sector. They regard industry as critical for national security and economic competitiveness, and many believe that industry-led growth is sufficient to reduce poverty. This preference for industry is known as urban bias. In contrast with most developing countries, East Asia emerged in the post-World War II period as a region that seemed to defy the logic of urban bias, achieving both urban-industrial growth and rural-agricultural development. Nevertheless, it is also true that East Asian governments exploited agriculture, eroding the prospects for long-term development and giving rise to significant rural–urban disparities. Focusing on Taiwan, South Korea, and China, the book examines how and why East Asia achieved rural development, and it advances a theory to explain variation among East Asian countries. It demonstrates that rural transformation in East Asia was not a byproduct of industrialization, but the result of aggressive interventions by strong and activist (if not exactly developmental) states.