In this paper, we propose a set of unifying definitions that are useful in all areas of fatigue research while remaining neutral to the various theories about fatigue. We first set up two criteria and four desiderata that a definition for interdisciplinary use needs to fulfill: (i) non-circularity, (ii) finiteness, (iii) broadness, (iv) precision, (v) neutrality, and (vi) phenomenon-focus. We argue that other existing attempts to unify definitions within fatigue research do not fulfill all of these criteria and desiderata. Instead, we argue for a set of stipulative definitions, centered around performance measures and subjective estimations, is required in order to maximize clarity. In total, a set of 13 distinct definitions of fatigue and fatigue-related phenomena is presented. These definitions will help facilitate communication between different researchers, link phenomena from divergent research fields together, facilitate application and knowledge production, and increase the specificity for hypothesis testing.

The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, their phenomenal character, such as the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-flow of the mind, such as their alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to be drawn here.

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