Psychopathology classification is at a conceptual crossroads. It is becoming increasingly accepted that the flaws of the DSM relate to its struggles to pick out "real" entities as opposed to clusters of symptoms. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) was formulated in response to this failure, and attempts to address the concerns confronting the DSM by shifting to a causal and continuous model of psychopathology. Noting key criticisms of neurocentricism and problems with conceptual validity leveled at the RDoC, we argue that they stem from its grounding in the metaphysical position of eliminative materialism, or at least material-reductionism. We propose that 3e cognition (viewing the mind as embodied, embedded, and enactive) offers a superior alternative to eliminative materialism. A 3e-informed framework of mental disorder is sketched out and its advantages as a basis for classifying and conceptualizing mental disorders are considered.

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Current arguments concerning the role of normativity within the concept of mental disorder are explored, and some requirements of a successful normative construal sketched out. We then shift to a discussion of "natural" normativity in order to lay the groundwork for our own understanding of what counts as mental disorder. The view we present is grounded in an enactive, embodied, and embedded view of the mind (3e cognition). The position argued for is one where the labeling of a particular set of behaviors as disordered or dysfunctional is justified by the significant violation of norms, but where the norms in question are not socially imposed but are the functional norms of the individual being diagnosed. The strengths and weaknesses of our position are discussed, and an addendum proposed in response to a foreseeable counter-argument. This construal provides a conceptual framework for thinking critically about normative issues in diagnosis, appreciates how central normativity is to the concept of mental disorder, and finally (in being tied to the functionality of the individual), places the institutions of psychiatry and clinical psychology on good ethical ground and allows for consideration of cultural and individual variation during the diagnostic process.

In this article, we briefly overview some current approaches to identifying targets of explanation in psychopathology. We suggest that DSM syndromes and symptom network models are too large to facilitate explanatory progress, while approaches couched in the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) are too tightly focused, thereby overlooking the self-maintaining structures and processes that constitute mental disorders. We then present the Relational Analysis of Phenomena (RAP) as a complementary method. The RAP is a metamethodological explanatory framework that prescribes the repeated targeting of “phenomena complexes” (PCs). PCs are small systems of clinical phenomena and their relations. We describe a process by which PCs are targeted, richly described, and then explained. The RAP’s explanatory focus is on the relationships between clinical phenomena, which should help to reveal the constitutional structure of mental disorders. This framework is designed to be useful for theoreticians, research teams planning multidisciplinary investigatory projects, and clinicians reflecting on their explanatory methods.

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