When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened long-term democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics.We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.

Global Constitutionalism as agora: Interdisciplinary encounters, cultural recognition and global diversity a n t j e w i e n e r , j e f f r e y l d u n o f f , j o n a t h a n h a v e r c r o f t , m a t t i a s k u m m a n d k r i s z t a k o v á c s GlobCon aims to be a place where meaningful discussion of pressing global issues can take place, and where the voices in that debate are drawn from a truly international community. 1

In spite of this, several scope-of-authority controversies have revealed a characteristic uncertainty that occurs in the Hungarian and other Central European parliamentary systems. Vindicating real power as the head of state and the depository of national sovereignty sometimes leads to theatrical struggles. From a comparative perspective, see N. Dorsen et al., Comparative Constitutionalism. Cases and Materials (Th omson-West 2003) p. 269. 5 With one exception: after the transition Estonia -following the Scandinavian model -set up a Constitutional review chamber in its Supreme Court.

Translation of the Bible or any other text unavoidably involves a determination about its meaning. There have been different views of meaning from ancient times up to the present, and a particularly Enlightenment and Modernist view is that the meaning of a text amounts to whatever the original author of the text intended it to be. This article analyzes the authorial-intent view of meaning in comparison with other models of literary and legal interpretation. Texts are anchors to interpretation but are subject to individualized interpretations. It is texts that are translated, not intentions. The challenge to the translator is to negotiate the meaning of a text and try to choose the most salient and appropriate interpretation as a basis for bringing the text to a new audience through translation.

No abstract