for helpful discussions and comments, James LeSage for making available his MATLAB spatial econometrics library and answering our questions, and Michael Ward for impressing us on the importance of space. This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-0214027). AbstractWhile spatial econometrics is being used more frequently in political science, most applications are still based on geographic notions of distance. Here we argue that it is often more fruitful to consider political economy notions of distance, such as relative trade. We also argue that the spatially autoregressive model usually (but not always) should be preferred to the spatially lagged error model. Finally, we consider the role of spatial econometrics in analyzing time-series-cross-section data, and show that a plausible (and testable) assumption allows for the simple introduction of space (however defined) into such analyses. Examples of spatial analyses involving trade and democracy are presented.

Mediation has competing short-and long-term A cursory glance at the diplomatic realm of international politics would suggest that mediation is an important element in the resolution of international conflict. Nobel Peace Prizes are awarded for successful efforts, and national leaders offer their services with considerable fanfare. Seasoned diplomats have contributed numerous essays and books on the subject. Yet mediation is rarely given much attention in the general literatures on international conflict. How, if at all, does mediation influence the powerful forces of international politics that lead states to clash?This article addresses competing views and findings of international mediation as a useful conflict management vehicle. Through a novel theoretical framework that specifies how mediation interacts with the crisis bargaining environment, it argues that mediation does well to secure short-term peace but leaves much to be desired in the long run. Mediators can facilitate information exchange, use leverage to increase the perceived costs of conflict, and promise enforcement. Since mediators generally do not remain involved after a crisis, such temporary effects, however, tend to weaken as the actors' bargaining positions change and the mediator's involvement wanes over time. More importantly, mediators often Kyle Beardsley is assistant professor of political science, Emory University, 317 Tarbutton Hall, Atlanta, GA 30322 (kyle.beardsley@ emory.edu).I am indebted to Dan Reiter, Cliff Carrubba, Jeff Staton, Eric Reinhardt, Kristian Gleditsch, David Lake, Branislav Slantchev, Barbara Walter, David Meyer, Holger Schmidt, participants of the PIPES workshop at the University of Chicago, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and discussion. I am especially appreciative of Nigel Lo's assistance in coding the data.1 It might be argued that the changing contextual environment after crisis termination makes it difficult to observe mediation's downstream consequences. However, the use of time-varying covariates in the empirical analysis enables one to sort out the effect of mediation from the effects of changing contexts. promote settlements that are not self-enforcing. Mediators thus not only struggle to curtail time inconsistency problems-when today's agreements become unsatisfactory tomorrow-they may actually exacerbate them by increasing the probability that short-term arrangements will not be viable in the future.Empirical findings using dyadic data of all international crises from 1918 to 2001 confirm that intermediaries can create artificial incentives which shape shortterm arrangements that are not viable in the absence of constant third-party influence. Mediation is positively associated with short-term peace agreements but not with the prevention of crisis recurrence. Event history models that account for nonproportional hazard rates and self-selection of mediation reveal that the ability for mediation to assuage postconflict relations diminishes over time until it actually makes crises more...

This study focuses on the varying effectiveness of three mediation styles—facilitation, formulation, and manipulation—on international crises. Effectiveness is assessed in terms of three outcome variables: formal agreement, post-crisis tension reduction, and contribution to crisis abatement. The authors analyze new data on the mediation process from the International Crisis Behavior project (1918-2001). Manipulation has the strongest effect on the likelihood of both reaching a formal agreement and contributing to crisis abatement. Facilitation has the greatest influence on increasing the prospects for lasting tension reduction. The authors explore how the different styles affect the strategic bargaining environment to explain these differences in impact. The findings suggest that mediators should use a balance of styles if they are to maximize their overall effectiveness.

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This article explores the effect of domestic and international politics on the choice of mediation as a conflict management strategy in international crises. Existing work has yet to fully explore how domestic and international audiences shape the combatants’ preferences for mediation. With regard to domestic pressures, combatants often desire mediation as political cover for unpalatable concessions. That is, intermediaries might obscure responsibility for disappointing outcomes or signal the prudence of compromise. In terms of international audiences, affected third parties eager to shape the resolution outcome might lobby to serve as a mediator. Since both domestic and international audiences are affected by the crisis severity, the article also explores how the pain of fighting conditions the effect of international and domestic political pressures. Empirical analysis of international crises since World War I confirms that potential domestic audience costs for seeking peace and the propensity for concessions positively affect the probability of mediation. Less clear is the role of third-party incentives; the results indicate that a higher potential for neighboring-state intervention actually decreases the likelihood of mediation. Consistent with previous studies, conflict costs increase mediation incidence, and the findings also indicate that at high costs of conflict, states appear in less need of political cover for making concessions.