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The end of the Cold War has precipitated a major rethinking of the United States' international commitments in both the scholarly and policymaking communities. For the first time in nearly half a century, the United States is fundamentally reconsidering both its military and economic relations with the outside world. However, the debate over how to restructure US foreign policy has generally focused on Europe. When analysts have referred to Asia, the emphasis has generally been on economic problems in the region. Similarly, the thrust of these works has tended to remain short-term, looking at the immediate future. This paper challenges these viewpoints. It argues that East Asia is as important as Europe to the United States, for security as well as economic reasons. The paper looks at the long-run as well as short-run trends in East Asia, and argues that the issues the US will face in the future will not arise solely from its traditional adversaries-a major problem will be managing conflicts within alliances.

East Asia has been at peace for more than a quarter century. For nearly every East Asian country save the most laggard, this long peace, to borrow John Lewis Gaddis words, has brought about unprecedented economic development and internal growth. The economic slump brought about the financial crisis of 1978-79 notwithstanding, East Asia continues to move forward and grow, becoming more interconnected, ever more interdependent, and increasingly more transparent. In the age of instant telecommunication and the internet, the process of integration and interdependence is likely to accelerate not slow. Arguably, after nearly a century of bloody conflict, destruction, and lost opportunities, East Asian states have finally come to appreciate the benefits of cooperation over conflict. It would, of course, be premature to assert that the dangers of renewed conflict in the region have declined to genuinely tolerable levels. North Koreas capacity to make trouble, the potential volatility of the China-Taiwan relationship, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, are among the more obvious areas of concern. Tension in between the United States and China over the introduction of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is the latest issue of contention clouding the regional security horizon. But in spite of these problems, East Asia is a fairly stable place at this juncture. There are no immediate political or military challenges that threaten to undermine the regions fundamental strategic stability. Nor is there any permanent basis for hostility amongst the major players in East Asia. The dangerous fires of militant nationalism that inflamed the region in the first half of the past century, and the antipathetic ideologies that fueled the Cold War for most of the second half, have now receded into history. In spite of East Asias apparent strategic stability, however, the major regional actors appear to be as preoccupied about their security as ever. What accounts for this paradox? Are security prospects for the region timely darkening as we enter this century? Or does the professed unease instead reflect exaggerated or unfounded fears and suspicions? What ought to be done in order to maintain strategic equilibrium, promote cooperative behavior on the part of potential rivals, and extend peace in the region?

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