No abstract

Many patients face years of recurrent and debilitating menstrual pain that affects their ability to work and study. Patients often normalize their severe pain as an expected part of menses. Both underrecognition and lack of awareness of available therapies for this remediable condition serve as a quintessential example of hermeneutic injustice. Hermeneutic injustice describes a structural lack of access to epistemic resources, such as shared concepts and knowledge. Pervasive menstrual stigma further discourages people with dysmenorrhea from discussing their symptoms and seeking health care. A lack of respect for women's experiences of pain in clinical encounters acts to worsen these issues and should be considered a source of iatrogenic harm. Health care workers can promote hermeneutic justice by preemptively destigmatizing discussions about menstruation and validating patients' concerns. On a systemic level, there should be greater awareness of dysmenorrhea and the various treatments available for it.The American Medical Association designates this journal-based CME activity for a maximum of 1 AMA PRA Category 1 Credit™ available through the AMA Ed Hub TM . Physicians should claim only the credit commensurate with the extent of their participation in the activity. CaseWhile taking a contraceptive history in clinic, Dr G's 55-year-old patient, JJ, remarks, "I wish I could have had an IUD when I menstruated." Dr G then uncovers a long history of JJ's painful menses with severe nausea, crippling cramps, and occasional fainting. JJ regularly missed at least a day of school or work each month."Did you see a physician when you had pain?" asks Dr G."No," said JJ. "Women didn't see physicians for that. I thought every woman had pain like me." CommentaryCountless people who menstruate have spent many days of their lives curled in bed unable to partake in their normal activities while they unnecessarily suffer from a

In many jurisdictions, legal frameworks afford patients the opportunity to make prospective medical decisions or to create directives that contain a special provision forfeiting their own ability to object to those decisions at a future time point, should they lose decision‐making capacity. These agreements have been described with widely varying nomenclatures, including Ulysses Contracts, Odysseus Transfers, Psychiatric Advance Directives with Ulysses Clauses, and Powers of Attorney with Special Provisions. As a consequence of this terminological heterogeneity, it is challenging for healthcare providers to understand the terms and uses of these agreements and for ethicists to engage with the nuances of clinical decision‐making with such unique provisions surrounding patient autonomy. In theory, prospective self‐binding agreements may safeguard patient's “authentic” wishes from future “inauthentic” changes of mind. In practice, it is unclear what may be comprised within these agreements or how—and to what effect—they are used. The primary focus of this integrative review is to curate the existing literature describing Ulysses Contracts (and analogous decisions) used in the clinical arena, in order to empirically synthesize their shared essence and provide insights into the traditional components of these agreements when used in practice, the requirements of their consent processes, and the outcomes of their utilization.