In Côte d’Ivoire, the use of fertilizers in rice farming still remains low. Credit constraints have been frequently reported as the main reason hampering rice farmers from reversing this situation. However, there is no empirical evidence on the link between rice farmers’ access to credit (AC) and fertilizer intensification (FI). This article examines this issue by using a sample of 600 rice farmers randomly selected in seven rice areas. Data are analyzed by the IV-Probit and IV-Tobit models. The results reveal that FI and AC reciprocally influence each other, implying that they are endogenous. An increase of credit by XOF 100 could increase the quantity of fertilizer used by 2.70 kg, all other things being equal. Moreover, FI and AC are strongly influenced by some socio-economic, rice farm, and institutional factors. Policymakers should take actions to facilitate rice farmers’ access to credit and subsidized fertilizers. Other relevant explanatory variables should be considered in rice farming development policies. By providing empirical evidence of the link between rice farmers’ access to credit and fertilizer intensification in Côte d’Ivoire, this paper contributes to the agricultural finance literature.

Purpose Several years after the regularization of microfinance activity in Côte d’Ivoire, smallholder farmers’ access to microfinance credits still remains marginal. The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze key determinants of access to microfinance credit in Sassandra-Marahoué District. Design/methodology/approach A total of 150 smallholder farmers were randomly sampled using an interview guide and semi-structured questionnaires. Univariate statistics and Probit binary modeling were employed for data analyses. Findings Results revealed that socio-economic/demographic characteristics of smallholder farmers and credit requirements imposed by microfinance institutions (MFIs) are key determinants of smallholder farmers’ access to microfinance credits in the district. Research limitations/implications Although, the authors shed light on the determinants of microfinance credit access for smallholder farmers in this district, the study focused on a single source of financial credit. Future research will need to explore the determinants of credit demand and the choice between different sources of rural credits in Côte d’Ivoire. Practical implications The findings suggest that MFIs seldom take into account smallholder farmers who are not engaged in off-farm income-generating activities and savings account; and those with low level of education. Sensitization programs on the importance of savings mobilization and credit policy by MFIs will potentially increase smallholder’s knowledge on credit access requirements and thereby increased access. Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study investigating determinants of smallholder farmers’ access to microfinance credits in Côte d’Ivoire specifically in the Sassandra-Marahoué District. The results of this study will serve as a guide for MFIs for improving smallholder farmers’ access to credit.

A good reputation is the basis for rice farmers to survive and gain trust from buyers in a competitive business environment. However, due to the existence of information asymmetry between buyers and rice farmers, the moral hazard problem is the key obstacle that impedes the benefits of related shareholders and hinders the efficiency of contract farming negotiations. It is crucial to design a control mechanism to avoid the negative impact of the moral hazard. This paper studies the principal and agent relationship between rice farmers and buyer in contract farming negotiation. Because of the influence of information asymmetry, many buyers have suffered from being cheated by rice farmers who fail to comply with the terms of the contract or provide fraudulent products in practice. These frequent cases will function to deteriorate any long-term relationships between rice farmers and buyers. The study focuses on the analysis of the causes of moral risks and the effect of reputation on moral risk utilizing repeated game theory. The purpose of this paper is to help both rice farmers and buyers effectively avoid moral hazards and achieve a win-win situation in contract farming negotiation. The result show that the rice farmer in contract farming practices has the incentive to maintain his reputation in order to gain more profits in the future. That also accounts for the reasons why the rice farmer will invest more to improve the customer's service level, caring about the quality of product and the comments of finished contractor customer, to keep a longer farmer-buyer relationship. The rice farmer in contract farming practices has the incentive to maintain his reputation in order to gain more profits in the future and this means that contract farming can be developed with great success in Benin.

This study aims to identify the factors that limit the accessibility of rice farmers to credit in Benin. Data were collected from 120 randomly selected rice households in the municipality of Glazoue. The logit dichotomous model was used to analyze the data and various statistics were produced for this purpose using the Stata 13 software. The results of prediction model show that the model has a high predictive power and the explanatory power giving by the value of the Pseudo  2 of McFadden (60.85%) show that more than 60% of the explanatory variables of the model make rice farmers' access to credit easier to understand. Literacy (P <0.001) and the part of income from rice in the monthly income of the rice farmer (P <0.001) had a positive effect on the rice farmer's capacity to have access to credit. Rice as the main speculation in terms of income (P <0.001) and household size (P <0.001) had a negative effect on access to credit. In order to facilitate rice farmers' access to agricultural credit, particular emphasis should be placed on the level of literacy of farmer, his monthly income from rice production, the size of his household and his main crop. This study recommends that the actors adapt to the service offering of microfinance to the socioeconomic conditions of rice farmers to enable them to access credit and increase rice production. This would help to meet the demand for rice, and, in turn, contribute to the reducing food insecurity in Benin.

Peasants’ calculation capacities (PCC) and measurement behaviors can enable the development of knowledge economy and technological exchanges. This study is based on critical observations made by analysis of Chinese and Ivorian rural markets to understand measurement system as a foundation of development of economic knowledge, science, and technology. A total of 167 rural people from China and Cote d’Ivoire were interviewed using a simple random sampling method through valid and reliable means. Using the univariate statistics, we summarized the data to statistically describe Chinese and Ivorian rural traders. The multiple linear regression model was used to examine the impact of different explanatory variables on peasants’ calculating capacities. From the independent two samples t-test, we statistically examined the difference between the calculation capacities of Chinese and Ivorian rural traders. Analysis of the data from China and Cote d’Ivoire showed that 76% of Chinese rural traders were using traditional or modern weighing balance compared to only 24% in Cote d’Ivoire. Modern or traditional weighing balance was popular only with traders or wholesalers dealing with bulk commodities, or traders with expensive products in the case of Cote d’Ivoire. Our findings also depict that the calculation capacities of Chinese rural traders are higher than Ivorian (p-value < 0.001). Experience was found to be the most effective factors for the estimation of PCC among Chinese and Ivorian rural traders. Together, these results significantly expand the knowledge, economy, and technology adoption issues in the context of China and Cote d’Ivoire. Thus, our analyses provide useful insights for policymakers, rural traders, advisers, for decision making and agricultural extension services in these two countries, particularly for China–Africa cooperation.