This article assesses the recent developments in the Turkish democratic reform processes, particularly those affecting the Kurdish minority, induced by Turkey's ambition to accede to the European Union (EU). The analysis is rooted in the Europeanization literature, specifically the external incentives model. In addition to providing a systematic review of recent political developments in this area, the analysis leads us to question some of the model's basic premises. Most notably, it is found that credible EU commitment, rather than low adoption costs and weak veto players, has constituted a necessary and sufficient condition for the reform process. Likewise, there is a dynamic relationship between EU-induced democratic reforms and adoption costs that is largely overlooked in the existing literature.

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Abstract:In this paper we look at the Turkish reform process with regard to the Kurdish minority from the perspective of Europeanization and in the light of the external incentives model. As a result, the paper provides a systematic analysis of recent political developments in this area. Additionally, our analysis leads to the questioning of some basic premises of the external incentives model. Most notably in this specific case we find that credible EU commitment, rather than low adoption costs and weak veto players, has constituted a necessary and sufficient condition for the reform process. Likewise, we find a dynamic relationship between EU induced democratic reforms and adoption costs that is largely overlooked in the model.

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