This article considers three answers to the question whether electricity access should be a universal human right. A first position is that there is no human right to electricity but perhaps contractual rights related to various societies. A second position is that electricity is a derived human right, a right based on other rights, grounded on rights such as the right to adequate housing. A third position is that there is a universal human right to electricity. It is argued that the second position is the strongest since it supports the idea that humans often need access to electricity but avoids the stronger claim that all humans must have this access. The latter claim faces the challenge that rights language should focus on the needs of humans and not be extended too far to include everything that could be beneficial for humans. Such an extension might diminish the attention on the actual aim of human rights: That all humans should have a good enough life.

In this work, we discuss how both contractualism, in the Western tradition, and communitarianism, in the African interpretation based on the idea of Ubuntu, conceptualise intergenerational justice. Even though both philosophical theories, taking into account differences and shortcomings, provide theoretical answers to intergenerational justice dilemmas, the implementation of actual policies in the interest of future individuals does not follow straightforwardly. Accordingly, in the second part of the chapter, we analyse what policy tools have been implemented or conceived to deliver intergenerational justice and we advocate a pragmatic approach pointing towards a mix of different policy tools. IntroductionEnergy justice is a relatively new theoretical framework for understanding the sustainability of the energy system and the allocation of burdens and benefits among all those actors that are involved in its various phases: those who produce, deliver, and consume energy and those who are called to manage the corresponding waste. McCauley (2018: 1-2) has recently defined energy justice as "the application of rights (both social and environmental) at each component part of the energy system". As any distributive scheme concerned with the assignment of social rights and the correlative duties among the members of society, energy justice brings with itself the problem of defining its scope. What are the geographical (or political) and the temporal borders that delineate the group of individuals whose rights and duties

This paper analyses the contribution of virtue ethics, the study of good character traits, to the humanitarian context. It argues that a virtue ethics perspective paints a realistic picture of the use of ethical standards in morally complex circumstances. Virtuous relief workers can employ standards in their thinking, but they are also committed to professional excellence that goes beyond any formal code. The concept of virtue ethics places a stress on moral development, which can be facilitated by role models that impart modest and feasible ideals. However, virtue ethics cannot provide simple guidelines on how to resolve difficult situations. It is possible that two virtuous persons can disagree on what should be done in a particular instance. In addition, a virtue ethics perspective emphasises the need for both individuals and organisations to discuss the actual purpose of relief work in order to pinpoint the virtues of a good relief professional.

Virtue ethics studies the character traits of good persons. This includes analysis of how ordinary persons can emulate moral role models in order to improve their moral character. This chapter investigates the link between virtues and disasters by relating classic and contemporary virtue ethical thinking to the character traits of humanity and resilience. The article finds ample support for the claim that these two character traits can be analysed as virtues and that classical virtue theorists can help us articulate the content of these traits. The contemporary discourse about virtues and disasters includes the long-standing analysis of the role of reason and emotions in virtues but the discourse also considers what kind of virtues that are relevant in disaster situations. Two important examples of the latter are the virtues of humanitarian workers and the virtues of those who suffer disasters. The chapter conclude that that future research should consider how training can strengthen individual resilience and how the pursuit of moral excellence can be included in the humanitarian field as a complement to minimum standards.

The main objective of article is to evaluate nuclear power in relation to alternative energy sources. A central claim is that the accident in Fukushima does not change the challenges facing the global system for electricity production. Given the need to minimize climate change and that nuclear power provides electricity with lower carbon emissions than fossil fuels, it is impossible to replace both nuclear power and fossil fuel plants in a few years. These plants provide a substantial part of our total generating capacity and cannot be easily substituted. However, if we made significant but non-radical reductions of our electricity consumption, the process of replacing both nuclear power and fossil fuels with renewable sources becomes easier. Reduction can be motivated by an egalitarian theory of justice which claims that it is wrong to maintain a lifestyle that threatens present humans and transfers risks unto future generations. Finally, it is concluded that our total electricity consumption is as important as its production when we plan for our society's energy future.