Trait self-control is often defined as the ability to inhibit dominant responses including thoughts, emotions, and behavioral impulses. Despite the pivotal role of inhibition for trait self-control, a growing body of evidence found small-to-zero correlations between self-report measures of trait self-control and behavioral inhibition tasks. These observations seem puzzling considering that both types of measures are often seen as operationalizations of the same or at least closely related theoretical constructs. Previous explanations for this non-correspondence focused on psychometric properties of the measures. Here, we discuss three further factors that may explain the empirical non-correspondence between trait self-control scales and behavioral inhibition tasks: (1) the distinction between typical and maximum performance, (2) the measurement of single versus repeated performance, and (3) differences between impulses in different domains. Specifically, we argue that a) self-report measures of trait self-control are designed to assess typical performance, and relative to these, behavioral inhibition tasks are designed to assess maximum performance; b) self-report measures of trait self-control capture central tendencies of aggregates of many different instances of behavior, whereas behavioral inhibition tasks are momentary, one-time state measures; and c) most self-report measures of trait self-control are designed to measure general, cross-domain inhibition, whereas behavioral inhibition tasks also measure narrower, domain-specific inhibition to a substantial degree. In conclusion, we argue that it is implausible to hypothesize more than a low correlation between self-report measures of trait self-control and behavioral inhibition tasks as they genuinely focus on different aspects of the theoretical construct of self-control. We also discuss the broader implications of these issues for self-control as a theoretical construct and its appropriate measurement.

With the seventh edition of the publication manual of the American Psychological Association (APA), the APA style now prescribes bias‐free language and encourages accessibility even to non‐academic audiences. However, even with the newest guidelines, the way we credit authors in psychology remains anachronistic, intransparent, and prone to conflict. It still relies on a sequence‐determines‐credit approach in the byline, which concurrently is contradicted by the option to consider the last author as the position of the principal investigator depending on the field or journal. Scholars from various disciplines have argued that relying on such norms introduces a considerable amount of error when stakeholders rely on articles for career‐relevant decisions. Given the existing recommendations towards a credit‐based system, ignoring those issues will further promote bias that could be avoided with rather minor changes to the way we perceive authorship. In this article, we introduce a set of easy‐to‐implement changes to the manuscript layout that value contribution rather than position. Aimed at fostering transparency, accountability, and equality between authors, establishing those changes would likely benefit all stakeholders in contemporary psychological science.

Self-control is widely believed to be a valuable characteristic that contributes to leading a healthy, happy, and successful life through the effective pursuit of long-term goals. Yet, despite a prolific literature spanning decades, essential questions about the conceptual nature of trait self-control remain unanswered. Substantially different perspectives on the theoretical nature of (trait) self-control coexist side by side. We briefly review prominent views informing what trait self-control as a psychological construct is. On this basis, we identify four conceptual challenges that we think the field should address moving forward: (a) integrating theoretical notions, (b) addressing variability in individual goals, (c) acknowledging variability in dominant responses, and (d) anchoring trait self-control in a nomological network.We highlight why addressing these challenges is crucial for gaining a deeper understanding of trait self-control. We also suggest how theoretical conceptualizations of trait self-control might do so and the implications this would bear for measurement and interventions.

Trait self-control is widely regarded as a powerful predictor of a broad range of desirable life outcomes. Trait self-control is correlated with and believed to contribute to physical and mental health, life satisfaction, interpersonal relationship quality and stability, academic and professional achievement, financial wealth, lack of criminal offending, and even the pace of biological aging (e.g., Belsky et al., 2017;. The predictive power of trait self-control for these outcomes spans years and decades and goes beyond other important predictors of a person's life journey, including intelligence and socioeconomic status (e.g., Daly et al., 2015;Daly et al., 2016;Moffitt et al., 2011). Training interventions to foster trait self-control have been conceptualized and applied, albeit with limited success (e.g., . Other interventions have focused on situational strategies to foster goal-congruent behavior . The potential of improving self-control for individuals and society at large seems enormous.Despite this thriving and diverse literature, foundational conceptual questions about trait self-control remain difficult to answer. There are several different theoretical perspectives on what (trait) self-control is, obfuscating what exactly the term refers to and how the construct is anchored in a nomological network of related constructs (e.g.,

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