The humanitarian sector has gone through a major shift toward injection of cash into vulnerable communities as its core modality. On this trajectory toward direct currency injection, something new has happened: namely the empowerment of communities to create their own local currencies, a tool known as Complementary Currency systems. This study mobilizes the concepts of endogenous regional development, import substitution and local market linkages as elaborated by Albert Hirschman and Jane Jacobs, to analyze the impact of a group of Complementary Currencies instituted by Grassroots Economics Foundation and the Red Cross in Kenya. The paper discusses humanitarian Cash and Voucher Assistance programs and compares them to a Complementary Currency system using Grassroots Economics as a case study. Transaction histories recorded on a blockchain and network visualizations show the ability of these Complementary Currencies to create diverse production capacity, dense local supply chains, and data for measuring the impact of humanitarian currency transfers. Since Complementary Currency systems prioritize both cooperation and localization, the paper argues that Complementary Currencies should become one of the tools in the Cash and Voucher Assistance toolbox.

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<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 27pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">A monopoly model is used to show why a CEO would engage in accounting fraud, high risk behavior given the severe negative consequences, should the fraud be exposed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>A monopoly model of the market transaction between the buyer of the fraud, the CEO, and the seller of the fraud, the accountant, demonstrates the motivation behind the CEO&rsquo;s willingness to engage in the fraud.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The accountant (seller) receives a monopolist profits while the CEO (the buyer) pays a price equal to the perceived net marginal benefit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The CEO wants the accountant to believe that the net marginal benefit equals the price when in fact the actual net marginal benefit to the CEO is much lower than the monopolist&rsquo;s price. The resulting cost to the CEO for fraud is relatively low because of the CEO&rsquo;s ability to shift a substantial portion of the cost to the company.</span></span></p>