The publication of the Turnbull guidance represented a radical redefinition of the nature of internal control as a feature of corporate governance in the UK, explicitly aligning internal control with risk management. This paper explores this change, using sociological perspectives on risk and its conceptualisation to frame the debate about internal control and risk management within the UK corporate governance arena – the most recent manifestation of an ongoing competition for the control of economic and social resources. The paper demonstrates that developments in corporate governance reporting requirements offer opportunities for the appropriation of risk and its management by groups wishing to advance their own interests. This is illustrated by a review of recent changes in internal audit.

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The establishment of board sub-committees has been strongly recommended as a suitable mechanism for improving corporate governance, by delegating specific tasks from the main board to a smaller group and harnessing the contribution of non-executive directors. In the UK, the Cadbury committee proposals focused on audit committees and the Greenbury study group advocated remuneration committees. Over the last decade, most large public com-panies have set up such committees, but their impact on governance standards has not been widely explored. This paper identifies significant differences in the orientation and operation of these committees. It also draws on interview data collected from participants in audit and remuneration committees to argue that these differences may lead to unacknowledged pressures on non-executive directors who form the membership of both committees. Given the current focus on the role of non-executive directors, the impact of such pressure is of particu-lar importance. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.

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In the wake of the report of the Cadbury Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, most major public companies in the UK now have an audit committee in place. However, commentators have noted that the establishment of an audit committee does not guarantee its effectiveness and it is pertinent to the continuing corporate governance debate to consider how such effectiveness may be assessed. This paper reports on a study which examines audit committee activities through interviews with audit committee chairs, finance directors and internal and external auditors. The study identifies influences on the development and activities of audit committees which have not previously been researched in any detail: these include the reasons for audit committee establishment, the timing and conduct of meetings, and communication between participants. The paper argues that audit committee effectiveness should be evaluated from a perspective which acknowledges these influences and recognises the continuing development of the audit committee role over time.