This collection of essays brings together scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds, based on three continents, with different theoretical and methodological interests but all active on the topic of complex systems as applied to international relations. They investigate how complex systems have been and can be applied in practice and what differences it makes for the study of international affairs. Two important threads link all the contributions: (i) To which extent is this approach promising to understand global governance dynamics? (ii) How can this be implemented in practice?

No abstract

No abstract

This article studies the functioning of dispute settlement mechanisms in regional trade agreements (RTAs) and their interaction with multilateral trade institutions. We examine the determinants of formal dispute initiation in RTAs among South American countries. Using an original data set of RTA disputes, we investigate the impact of economic power disparities, domestic political factors, and previous experience on the decision of South American countries to initiate a dispute against a regional trade partner. Our analysis indicates that both power asymmetries and domestic political factors influence the likelihood of dispute initiation at the regional level. We also find strong support for our hypothesis that previous experience in dispute settlement increases the probability that a country will file a complaint against a regional trade partner using regional mechanisms. Perhaps more interestingly, our empirical analysis also uncovers important cross‐institutional effects. Prior participation in WTO disputes increases the propensity of states to file complaints at the regional level.

What are the consequences of increasing regime complexity and institutional proliferation on global governance? Does the growing density and overlaps among institutions facilitate or hinder the ability of states to manage transnational threats through cooperation? This article argues that the impact of regime complexity on the effectiveness of cooperation depends not only on the nature of spillovers among overlapping regimes, but also on the cross-institutional strategies of states and nonstate actors. I distinguish between two types of strategies through which actors can take advantage of institutional overlaps: (1) "opportunistic" or non-cooperative attempts by states to bypass legal commitments, which tend to undermine the goals of cooperation; and (2) "cooperative" strategies by intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and other principled actors. These actors also engage in regime shifting, forum linking, and other cross-forum strategies to promote their institutional mandates and normative agendas. To probe the plausibility of these theoretical claims, I focus on the case of the anti-trafficking in persons regime. The overlaps between anti-trafficking laws and the migration, labor, and human rights regimes illustrate the different ways in which intergovernmental organizations and their allies in society can exploit institutional overlaps to promote greater cooperation and expand the regime complex.