Abstract Introduction In 2014, Brännström and colleagues reported the first human live birth following uterine transplantation (UTx). Research into this treatment for absolute uterine factor infertility has since grown with clinical trials currently taking place across centers in at least thirteen countries worldwide. Sources of data This review summarizes and critiques the academic literature on ethical and policy issues raised by UTx. Areas of agreement There is general agreement on the importance of risk reduction and, in principle, to the sharing and maintenance of patient data on an international registry. Areas of controversy There are numerous areas of controversy ranging from whether it is ethically justified to carry out uterus transplants at all (considering the associated health risks) to how deceased donor organs for transplant should be allocated. This review focuses on three key issues: the choice between deceased and living donors, ensuring valid consent to the procedure and access to treatment. Growing points UTx is presently a novel and rare procedure but is likely to become more commonplace in the foreseeable future, given the large number of surgical teams working on it worldwide. Areas timely for developing research Uterus transplantation requires us to re-examine fundamental questions about the ethical and social value of gestation. If eventually extended to transgender women or even to men, it may also require us to reconceptualize what it is to be a ‘father’ or to be a ‘mother’, and the definition of these terms in law.

Over the course of recent years, various scientific advances in the realm of reproduction have changed the reproductive landscape, enhancing women’s procreative rights and the choices available to them. Uterus transplants (UTx) are the latest of such medical innovations aimed at restoring fertility in women suffering from absolute uterine factor infertility, providing them with the possibility not only of conceiving a genetically related child but also of gestating their own pregnancies. This paper critically examines the primacy of reproductive liberty in the context of uterus transplantation. It questions whether and to what extent we should respect the reproductive autonomy of a woman who chooses UTx, given the significant risks that attach to the procedure and existing concerns that UTx may perpetuate potentially troubling gendered norms surrounding pregnancy and the role of women’s bodies in reproduction, which may place undue reproductive pressures on women.

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Uterine transplantation (UTx) is a programme of treatment aimed at providing a unique solution to absolute uterine factor infertility, enabling patients to have children as a result of their own pregnancies. As a transplant procedure performed for fertility purposes it may be thought obvious that the welfare of any children created should be assessed prior to treatment provision. However, major concerns about the breadth and scope of such requirements, and the potential threat they pose to patients' reproductive autonomy, have been raised. In this paper, I analyse novel questions regarding the role of the pre-conception welfare principle in UTx. After outlining traditional critiques of the principle, I focus on the unique issues raised by its application in the two areas of medicine occupied by UTx. As a treatment for a particular form of infertility, I explore whether law and policy regulating traditional assisted reproductive technologies applies equally to the case of UTx, and whether a distinction (in welfare terms) does and should exist between fertility treatment involving gametes and embryos and gynaecological surgery for fertility purposes. As a quality-of-life-enhancing transplant, I consider and reject proposals in favour of using pre-conception welfare considerations to inform patient listing and the allocation of deceased donor uteri on the grounds that such assessments may both compromise patient autonomy and lead to unjust discrimination against particular patients or groups of patients.

It is often claimed that a legitimate approach to organ donation is an opt-out system, also known as ‘presumed consent’, ‘deemed consent’, or ‘deemed authorisation’, whereby individuals are presumed or deemed willing to donate at least some of their organs and tissues after death unless they have explicitly refused permission. While sharing a default in favour of donation, such systems differ in several key respects, such as the role and importance assigned to the family members of prospective donors and their preferences, and exclusions and safeguards which often specify the demographic groups, purposes, or organs and tissues that will remain outside the scope of the opt-out system. Using the recent shift to opt-out in England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland as case studies, and by reference to the key goals motivating this shift across the UK, this article asks whether and, if so, why, and how, opt-out systems for post-mortem organ donation should restrict the types of organs and tissues for which consent is deemed. In other words, ought opt-out systems for PMOD presume dissent regarding the donation of certain organs and tissues?