We present a new interatomic potential for solids and liquids called Spectral Neighbor Analysis Potential (SNAP). The SNAP potential has a very general form and uses machinelearning techniques to reproduce the energies, forces, and stress tensors of a large set of small configurations of atoms, which are obtained using high-accuracy quantum electronic structure (QM) calculations. The local environment of each atom is characterized by a set of bispectrum components of the local neighbor density projected onto a basis of hyperspherical harmonics in four dimensions. The bispectrum components are the same bond-orientational order parameters employed by the GAP potential [1]. The SNAP potential, unlike GAP, assumes a linear relationship between atom energy and bispectrum components. The linear SNAP coefficients are determined using weighted least-squares linear regression against the full QM training set. This allows the SNAP potential to be fit in a robust, automated manner to large QM data sets using many bispectrum components. The calculation of the bispectrum components and the SNAP potential are implemented in the LAMMPS parallel molecular dynamics code. We demonstrate that a previously unnoticed symmetry property can be exploited to reduce the computational cost of the force calculations by more than one order of magnitude. We present results for a SNAP potential for tantalum, showing that it accurately reproduces a range of commonly calculated properties of both the crystalline solid and the liquid phases. In addition, unlike simpler existing potentials, SNAP correctly predicts the energy barrier for screw dislocation migration in BCC tantalum.

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O S T I This paper presents a graph-based approach to network vulnerability analysis. The method is flexible, allowing analysis of attacks from both outside and inside the network. It can analyze risks to a specific network asset, or examine the universe of possible consequences following a successful attack. The graph-based tool can identify the set of attack paths that have a high probability of success (or a low "effort" cost) for the attacker. The system could be used to test the effectiveness of making configuration changes, implementing an intrusion detection system, etc. The analysis system requires as input a database of common attacks, broken into atomic steps, specific network configuration and topology information, and an attacker profile. The attack information is "matched" with the network configuration information and an attacker profile to create a superset attack graph. Nodes identify a stage of attack, for example the class of machines the attacker has accessed and the user privilege level he or she has compromised. The arcs in the attack graph represent attacks or stages of attacks. By assigning probabilities of success on the arcs or costs representing level-of-effort for the attacker, various graph algorithms such as shortest-path algorithms can identify the attack paths with the highest probability of success.

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