This article examines citizens who combine liberalism on one of two major issue dimensions with conservatism on the other, assessing whether they are less politically engaged than "consistent" liberals and conservatives and whether this relationship has strengthened over time with elite polarization. It also explores the contributions of cross-pressures, partisanship, and alienation to contemporary ideological differences in political engagement. This article departs from most existing research by defining ideology two dimensionally. Using the 1984-2008 American National Election Studies, it finds that culturally conservative, economically liberal Americans and to a lesser extent culturally liberal, economically conservative Americans are less engaged in elections than "consistent" liberals and conservatives. Different factors explain these differences with liberals and conservatives, but crosspressures do not demobilize either "two-dimensional ideologue." Over time, the increased involvement of liberals and conservatives has produced a growing ideological gap in political engagement.

Pro-life "crisis pregnancy centers" are an increasingly important venue for the American abortion conflict, yet scholars know little about them. The increasing concentration of abortion among the poor also potentially heightens their relevance since they aim to reduce abortion through offers of practical support. This article describes this branch of the pro-life movement, focusing on its approach to poverty and the political factors that may shape it. My national, mixed-method study of pro-life pregnancy centers finds that they devote substantial attention to poverty, frequently collaborate with social welfare agencies, and claim that a compassionate, "woman-centered" approach differentiates them from other pro-life groups. Despite this, there is little evidence that the development of such centers is related to conflict in the pro-life movement over poverty.

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This article tests if welfare generosity is related to abortion rates, allowing effects to vary by program type and abortion policy context. Copyright (c) 2010 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.

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