This paper contributes to the resolution of the rights offer paradox, using a database of French SEOs. We first document higher direct flotation costs, but also improved stock market liquidity after public offerings and standby rights relative to uninsured rights. We find that blockholder renouncements to subscribe to new shares and stock market liquidity are important determinants of flotation method choice. After controlling for endogeneity in the choice of flotation method, we find that public offerings are cost effective and more liquidity improving than standby rights whereas an uninsured rights offering is the best choice for low liquidity, closely held firms. Our results provide new insights as to why firms choose public offerings despite apparently higher costs.

This paper contributes to the resolution of the rights offer paradox, using a database of French SEOs. We first document higher direct flotation costs, but also improved stock market liquidity after public offerings and standby rights relative to uninsured rights. We find that blockholder renouncements to subscribe to new shares and stock market liquidity are important determinants of flotation method choice. After controlling for endogeneity in the choice of flotation method, we find that public offerings are cost effective and more liquidity improving than standby rights whereas an uninsured rights offering is the best choice for low liquidity, closely held firms. Our results provide new insights as to why firms choose public offerings despite apparently higher costs.

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In this study, we investigate the trading dynamics around rights issues. We employ signed and unsigned trading activity measures in order to provide evidence of costly financial intermediation. We, first, document short selling activity by underwriters and shareholders during rights issues leading to significant negative abnormal returns during the offer. Further, we provide evidence that rights tend to be sold below their fair value. Our results, therefore, suggest that the lack of use of rights offering, referred to as the rights offer paradox can be explained by indirect costs related to the nature of constraints confronting underwriters and shareholders but also to trading mistakes on the rights market.