This article examines the perspectives, strategies and practical 'common sense' of those charged with regulating and enforcing securities laws in the post-Enron era. It argues that crackdown periods following stock market disasters disrupt dominant patterns of governance and empower regulators to proactively enforce laws against powerful financial actors. The article shows how officials negotiate their regulatory terrain and accommodate the economic and social capital of the 'stakeholders' they are charged with regulating outside crisis periods and how they re-interpret and redefine their mission in response to political, economic and ideological change. Empirically the article is based on 21 interviews with regulators and enforcement staff in securities commissions and law enforcement, and on the discourses and directives found in key regulatory documents. KEY WORDS corporate crime; governance; habitus; regulation; stock market fraud A system of governance is most effective when governed subjects voluntarily adopt and internalize its norms, values and ambitions as their own. (Rose, 1989: 50) The OSC seems not to have been captured by the sector it regulates but handed over to them. (Andrews, 2006: 86) SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES

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This article makes three arguments: first, that the brand of state regulation known as corporate crime has basically disappeared; second, that it has been argued into obsolescence through neoliberal knowledge claims advanced through specific discourses by powerful elites; and third, that the acceptance of these knowledge claims cannot be understood without examining their relationship to the corporate counter-revolution that has, over the last two decades, legitimized virtually every acquisitive, profit-generating act of the corporate sector, transforming the developed (and developing) world.

Le probletne initial de la « violence a I'egard de la femme