Adult and adolescent Ss were asked to list possible consequences of either accepting or declining opportunities to engage in various potentially risky behaviors (e.g., drinking and driving, skipping school to go to a mall). Response patterns were quite similar for these adults and adolescents, indicating shared beliefs about the possibilities. Although taking and avoiding a risk are logically complementary actions, they did not prove to be psychologically complementary. Other comparisons showed systematic differences in the consequences produced for one-time and regular (or repeated) versions of the same behaviors, as well as for open-ended and closed-ended response modes. These results are discussed in terms of their methodological implications for studying risk perceptions, their practical implications for influencing adolescents' risk behaviors, and their theoretical implications for understanding intellectual development.In recent years, there has been much concern about adolescents' "risk taking" behavior, such as reckless driving, sex without contraceptives, drug use, and drinking (Dryfoos, 1990;

Individuals' decisions and behaviour can play a critical role in determining both the probability and severity of injury. Behavioural decision research studies peoples' decision-making processes in terms comparable to scientific models of optimal choices, providing a basis for focusing interventions on the most critical opportunities to reduce risks. That research often seeks to identify the ‘mental models’ that underlie individuals' interpretations of their circumstances and the outcomes of possible actions. In the context of injury prevention, a mental models approach would ask why people fail to see risks, do not make use of available protective interventions or misjudge the effectiveness of protective measures. If these misunderstandings can be reduced through context-appropriate risk communications, then their improved mental models may help people to engage more effectively in behaviours that they judge to be in their own best interest. If that proves impossible, then people may need specific instructions, not trusting to intuition or even paternalistic protection against situations that they cannot sufficiently control. The method entails working with domain specialists to elicit and create an expert model of the risk situation, interviewing lay people to elicit their comparable mental models, and developing and evaluating communication interventions designed to close the gaps between lay people and experts. This paper reviews the theory and method behind this research stream and uses examples to discuss how the approach can be used to develop scientifically validated context-sensitive injury risk communications.

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Background. The same test with the same result has different positive predictive values (PPVs) for people with different pretest probability of disease. Representative thinking theory suggests people are unlikely to realize this because they ignore or underweight prior beliefs when given new information (e.g., test results) or due to confusing test sensitivity (probability of positive test given disease) with PPV (probability of disease given positive test). This research examines whether physicians and MBAs intuitively know that PPV following positive mammography for an asymptomatic woman is less than PPV for a symptomatic woman and, if so, whether they correctly perceive the difference. Design. Sixty general practitioners (GPs) and 84 MBA students were given 2 vignettes of women with abnormal (positive) mammography tests: 1 with prior symptoms (diagnostic test), the other an asymptomatic woman participating in mass screening (screening test). Respondents estimated pretest and posttest probabilities. Sensitivity and specificity were neither provided nor elicited. Results. Eighty-eight percent of GPs and 46% of MBAs considered base rates and estimated PPV in diagnosis greater than PPV in screening. On average, GPs estimated a 27-point difference and MBAs an 18-point difference, compared to actual of 55 or more points. Ten percent of GPs and 46% of MBAs ignored base rates, incorrectly assessing the 2 PPVs as equal. Conclusions. Physicians and patients are better at intuitive Bayesian reasoning than is suggested by studies that make test accuracy values readily available to be confused with PPV. However, MBAs and physicians interpret a positive in screening as more similar to a positive in diagnosis than it is, with nearly half of MBAs and some physicians wrongly equating the two. This has implications for overdiagnosis and overtreatment.