We present a revision of the 1978 reformulated theory of helplessness and depression and call it the hopelessness theory of depression. Although the 1978 reformulation has generated a vast amount of empirical work on depression over the past 10 years and recently has been evaluated as a model of depression, we do not think that it presents a clearly articulated theory of depression. We build on the skeletal logic of the 1978 statement and (a) propose a hypothesized subtype of depressionhopelessness depression, (b) introduce hopelessness as a proximal sufficient cause of the symptoms of hopelessness depression, (c) deemphasize causal attributions because inferred negative consequences and inferred negative characteristics about the self are also postulated to contribute to the formation of hopelessness and, in turn, the symptoms of hopelessness depression, and (d) clarify the diathesisstress and causal mediation components implied, but not explicitly articulated, in the 1978 statement. We report promising findings for the hopelessness theory and outline the aspects that still need to be tested. In this article, we present a revision of the 1978 reformulated theory of helplessness and depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) and call it the hopelessness theory of depression. Our motive for proposing the revision is that, although the 1978 reformulation has generated a vast amount of empirical work on depression over the past 10 years (see Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986, for a meta-analysis of 104 studies) and recently has been evaluated as a model of depression (Bamett & Gotlib, 1988; Brewin, 1985; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Peterson & Seligman, 1984), the 1978 article did not explicitly present a clearly articulated theory of depression. Instead, it presented an attributional account of human helplessness and only briefly discussed its implications for depression. Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that much controversy currently exists about the status of the reformulated theory of depression. Some reviewers have argued that it has strong empirical support (Peterson & Seligman, 1984), others have contended that it has a weak empirical base (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983), and still others have suggested it never has been tested adequately (Ab
SUMMARYHow are humans' subjective judgments of contingencies related to objective contingencies? Work in social psychology and human contingency learning predicts that the greater the frequency of desired outcomes, the greater people's judgments of contingency will be. Second, the learned helplessness theory of depression provides both a strong and a weak prediction concerning the linkage between subjective and objective contingencies. According to the strong prediction, depressed individuals should underestimate the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes relative to the objective degree of contingency. According to the weak prediction, depressed individuals merely should judge that there is a smaller degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes than nondepressed individuals should. In addition, the present investigation deduced a new strong prediction from the helplessness theory: Nondepressed individuals should overestimate the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes relative to the objective degree of contingency.In the experiments, depressed and nondepressed students were presented with one of a series of problems varying in the actual degree of contingency. In each problem, subjects estimated the degree of contingency between their responses (pressing or not pressing a button) and an environmental outcome (onset of a green light). Performance on a behavioral task and estimates of the conditional probability of green light onset associated with the two response alternatives provided additional measures for assessing beliefs about contingencies.Depressed students' judgments of contingency were surprisingly accurate in all four experiments. Nondepressed students, on the other hand, overestimated the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes when noncontingent outcomes were frequent and/or desired and underestimated the degree of contingency when contingent outcomes were undesired. Thus, predictions derived from social psychology concerning the linkage between subjective and objective contingencies were confirmed for nondepressed students but not for depressed students. Further, the predictions of helplessness theory received, at best, minimal support.The learned helplessness and self-serving motivational bias hypotheses are evaluated as explanations of the results. In addition, parallels are drawn between the present results and phenomena in cognitive psychology, social psychology, and animal learning. Finally, implications for cognitive illusions in normal people, appetitive helplessness, judgment of contingency between stimuli, and learning theory are discussed.
Rumination has been widely studied and is a crucial component in the study of cognitive vulnerabilities to depression. However, rumination means different things in the context of different theories, and has not been uniformly defined or measured. This article aims to review models of rumination, as well as the various ways in which it is assessed. The models are compared and contrasted with respect to several important dimensions of rumination. Guidelines to consider in the selection of a model and measure of rumination are presented, and suggestions for the conceptualization of rumination are offered. In addition, rumination's relation to other similar constructs is evaluated. Finally, future directions for the study of ruminative phenomena are presented. It is hoped that this article will be a useful guide to those interested in studying the multifaceted construct of rumination.
Within the past 20 years, depression research has given increasing consideration to the possibility of complex and reciprocal relations between stress and depression. Not only does stress increase risk for depression (i.e., a stress exposure model of depression), but depression, or depressogenic vulnerabilities, in turn, also increases susceptibility to stressful events that are at least in part influenced by the individual (i.e., stress generation; Hammen, 1991). The present review provides a systematic examination of the stress generation literature to date, with specific focus given to depression and depressogenic risk factors (i.e., past stress, negative cognitive styles, and personality and interpersonal vulnerabilities) as predictors of the stress generation effect, as well as gender differences in stress generation, the sequelae of generated stress, and the relative specificity of this phenomenon to depression. The research thus far appears most consistent in supporting the role of depression in predicting generated stress, although more research is still required. In addition to highlighting these findings, methodological limitations and conceptual gaps in the literature are discussed with the view of informing future research in this area.
The authors tested the cognitive vulnerability hypotheses of depression with a retrospective behavioral high-risk design. Individuals without current Axis I diagnoses who exhibited either negative or positive cognitive styles were compared on lifetime prevalence of depressive and other disorders and the clinical parameters of depressive episodes. Consistent with predictions, cognitively high-risk participants had higher lifetime prevalence than low-risk participants of major and hopelessness depression and marginally higher prevalence of minor depression. These group differences were specific to depressive disorders. The high-risk group also had more severe depressions than the low-risk group, but not longer duration or earlier onset depressions. The risk group differences in prevalence of depressive disorders were not mediated by current depressive symptoms.
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