As of 1984, only four circuits published a majority of their opinions. The Third Circuit published a mere 22.9% of its opinions that year. Even more dramatic differences within circuits are possible when one looks at publication rates within subject-matter areas. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.

Federal district courts have viewed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 as a mandate to adopt procedural rules inconsistent with existing law. But in this article, Professor Robel argues that the Act neither compels nor authorizes such local deviations. Citing examples from reforms underway in district courts nationwide, Professor Robel contends that courts' assertions of broad rulemaking authority rest on a misreading of the Act and of the compromise between Congress and the judiciary that led to its passage. Professor Robel cautions that the goal of national uniformity underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be compromised lightly. However, she argues that, while probably unwise, the Civil Justice Reform Act was within Congress' constitutional power to enact. She concludes by urging rulemakers to more carefully consider the costs and benefits of local rules. 5. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CiviL JUSTICE REFoRM Acr RFORT. DEVELoPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS BY EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DISTRICTS AND PILOT COURTS (1992) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE RaoRT] (discussing alternative dispute resolution, mandatory disclosure, and contingent fees). 6. Don J. DeBenedictis, An Experiment in Reform, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 16, 16. DeBenedictis further noted that "[t]he differences are great enough that a fat report on the early plans from a special task force of the ABA Litigation Section is largely made up of charts giving side-by-side comparisons of the courts' approaches to assorted topics." Id. Not only the ABA finds interpreting the broad range of courts' responses awkward. A recent Judicial Conference Report to Congress was largely reduced to descriptions and charts tracking each district's developments. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5. 7. To review the long and difficult path towards uniformity which culminated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Stephen B.

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Federal courts supervise state criminal justice administration through decisions under two federal statutes, the Habeas Corpus Act and section 1983, a Civil Rights Act provision. These statutes provide overlapping review of constitutional errors. Habeas law has become too technical, limited by procedural barriers that often result in prisoners' losing their constitutional claims; moreover, the overlap between the two statutes adds further confusion. The theoretical basis for this complicated system of duplicative litigation no longer exists. Because the most important law of criminal procedure is now completely federal, state courts have no institutional reason to resist its application in favor of their own. Habeas law should be reformed and simplified to protect the goals of criminal procedure: innocence and deterrence of unreasonable state-court constitutional interpretations. Section 1983 litigation revisiting issues that the plaintiff had a meaningful opportunity to raise in state court or on habeas should be curtailed, unless the plaintiff demonstrates that one of those courts has ruled in his favor.