Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Hood (2010), this paper will show how such reforms mean that transparency and accountability are moving from being 'matching parts' to an 'awkward couple', and how this has significant implications for public services.

The creation of companies by local governments to provide public services-referred to as "corporatization"-is an example of systemic public entrepreneurship that is popular across the world. To build knowledge of the antecedents of public sector entrepreneurship, the authors investigate the factors that lead local governments to create companies for public service delivery. Using zero-inflated negative binomial regressions to analyze secondary data from 150 major English local governments for 2010-16, the authors find that governments with higher levels of grant dependence and debt dependence are more involved in the creation and operation of companies, as are larger governments. Further analysis reveals that very low and very high managerial capabilities are strongly associated with more involvement in profit-making companies, while local government involvement in companies is more prevalent in deprived areas. At the same time, government ownership of companies is more common in areas with high economic output. Evidence for Practice• In a context of budget cuts, grant dependence and debt dependence are leading local governments in England to corporatize service provision. • Local governments with low or high management capacity are motivated to create and control more companies, especially profit-making entities. • Systemic entrepreneurial activity within English local governments does not depend on left-wing or rightwing political control.

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to shed light on new accountability relationships between Newcastle City Council (NCC) and its citizens and stakeholders in the wake of the British government's austerity politics and its budget cuts for local authorities. It seeks to show some of the ways in which various kinds of budgeting, for example, for alternative sources of funding, the use of volunteers for service provision, resource sharing, and asset transfers, as well as a diverse set of accounts of the social implications of resource diversions and service cuts, have been implicated in those changes.Design/methodology/approach: We conducted a qualitative field study of some of the uses of budgets in the shaping of accountability relationships through interviews with Council officers, conversations with activists and citizens, analysis of Council and other documents, and observation of public meetings and demonstrations. Our approach focused on the relationship between the city's political grassroots and the NCC leadership and administration. Findings:We find that NCC's senior politicians and officers co-opted the city's political grassroots and managed to reconstitute local political accountability to citizenry and stakeholders as a choice between the cessation of different types of local government services, by combining appeals to the legal framework of English local authorities, the unfairness of national politics, and the fairness of local government service provision. Local government blamed the funding cuts and the resulting resource shortages on the central government. It sought to push responsibility for cuts to the local citizenry whilst reserving for itself the role of mediator and adjudicator who makes the final decisions about the portfolio of causes that will be funded.Originality/value: This is the first study to offer detailed insight into the effects of the British government's austerity budget cuts of local authority grants on the politics of accountability in a local authority.

PurposeThe financial resilience of local authorities has been a serious concern over the past decade due to austerity and its effects on local government budgets despite rising service demands. More recently, the scale and suddenness of the shock from COVID-19 has exacerbated problems of financial resilience. This paper explores the financial management responses required by a sudden, nationwide pandemic of such severity.Design/methodology/approachThis paper applies the concept of financial resilience to English local government to analyse their situation in the aftermath of COVID-19. It is based on a close reading of official reports and the news media.FindingsLocal authority’s financial resilience could deal with normal levels of risk arising from austerity. However, the seriousness of COVID-19 alongside pressures still emanating from Brexit requires a significant level of central government support. This is critical as local government is expected to underpin future economic growth of the UK as well as deliver an important social response. Presently, the financial framework for funding individual local authorities through central government in terms of COVID-19 support is not on a reliable footing to answer specific demands. This can lead to gaming and perverse incentives.Originality/valueThis is the first paper to connect the financial resilience in the local government framework with the required central government funding procedures for sudden nationwide crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. It identifies the need to define what effect key variables, such as local government financial reserves, local deprivation indices and anticipatory financial management practices in local government should have on the determination of central government aid for individual local authorities.

This paper compares audit regulatory space in local government between the U.K.’s four countries – England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. It addresses current arrangements and practices, their historical background, and rationales for regulation in order to derive lessons for the future of public audit. It draws on the notion of regulatory space as extended through new audit spaces that specifically include public audit. The study is based on interviews with audit professionals and policy makers in each country, extensive documentation review, and observation. The comparison is structured by four themes: ‘Organisation and fragmentation’ concerns how the system is accredited and imbued with institutional capital. ‘Independence and competition’ addresses the independence of accounting firms and auditors, ‘audit scope’ reporting, and ‘inspection’ the assessments and rankings that have become part of public audit. The four countries exhibited similar emphasis on financial audit and reporting. They treated performance and fairness aspects differently.