Nudges are behavioral interventions to subtly steer citizens’ choices toward “desirable” options. An important topic of debate concerns the legitimacy of nudging as a policy instrument, and there is a focus on issues relating to nudge transparency, the role of preexisting preferences people may have, and the premise that nudges primarily affect people when they are in “irrational” modes of thinking. Empirical insights into how these factors affect the extent to which people are susceptible to nudge influence (i.e., “nudgeable”) are lacking in the debate. This article introduces the new concept of nudgeability and makes a first attempt to synthesize the evidence on when people are responsive to nudges. We find that nudge effects do not hinge on transparency or modes of thinking but that personal preferences moderate effects such that people cannot be nudged into something they do not want. We conclude that, in view of these findings, concerns about nudging legitimacy should be softened and that future research should attend to these and other conditions of nudgeability.

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Nudges are defined as small adjustments in the choice architecture that help people perform desirable behavior. How nudges interact with individuals’ motivation has not been studied empirically. We conducted three studies with different types of defaults in three different behavioral domains and investigated how defaults and different types of motivation affect choice outcomes. In Study 1, we investigated the effectiveness of a default to stimulate healthy eating choices implemented in a hypothetical online supermarket setting. In Study 2, we used a scenario in which participants could choose from a list of green amenities (either preselected or not). In Study 3, we asked participants if they wanted to participate in a basic or longer version of our questionnaire, with the longer version option set as the default in the nudge condition. Across three studies we show that defaults are effective in promoting desirable behavior, and that goal strivings and autonomous motivation have additional positive main effects. We did not find evidence that controlled motivation did affect behavioral outcomes. Exploratory analyses revealed that amotivation negatively affected behavior, but the measure had poor reliability. No significant interaction effects were observed. Together, these studies imply that both defaults and motivation have main effects on behavior, such that the default sets the anchor from which people can adjust according to the type and strength of their motivation. Implications for the practice and ethics of nudging are discussed.