In May 2015, Zika virus was reported to be circulating in Brazil. This was the first identified introduction of the virus in the Region of the Americas. Since that time, Zika virus has rapidly spread throughout the region. As of April 20, 2016, the Florida Department of Health Bureau of Public Health Laboratories (BPHL) has tested specimens from 913 persons who met state criteria for Zika virus testing. Among these 913 persons, 91 met confirmed or probable Zika virus disease case criteria and all cases were travel-associated (1). On the basis of previous small case studies reporting real time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) detection of Zika virus RNA in urine, saliva, and semen (2-6), the Florida Department of Health collected multiple specimen types from persons with suspected Zika virus disease. Test results were evaluated by specimen type and number of days after symptom onset to determine the most sensitive and efficient testing algorithm for acute Zika virus disease. Urine specimens were collected from 70 patients with suspected Zika virus disease from zero to 20 days after symptom onset. Of these, 65 (93%) tested positive for Zika virus RNA by RT-PCR. Results for 95% (52/55) of urine specimens collected from persons within 5 days of symptom onset tested positive by RT-PCR; only 56% (31/55) of serum specimens collected on the same date tested positive by RT-PCR. Results for 82% (9/11) of urine specimens collected >5 days after symptom onset tested positive by RT-PCR; none of the RT-PCR tests for serum specimens were positive. No cases had results that were exclusively positive by RT-PCR testing of saliva. BPHL testing results suggest urine might be the preferred specimen type to identify acute Zika virus disease.

Zika virus RNA was detected in the serum of five pregnant women beyond the previously estimated timeframe. Additional real-time RT-PCR testing of pregnant women might provide more data about prolonged detection of Zika virus RNA and the possible diagnostic, epidemiologic, and clinical implications for pregnant women.

publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active. Article Travel Surveillance and Genomics Uncover a Hidden Zika Outbreak during the Waning EpidemicGraphical Abstract Highlights d Travel surveillance and genomics uncovered hidden Zika transmission d An unreported and 1-year delayed Zika outbreak was detected in Cuba d Mosquito control may delay, not prevent, Zika virus establishment d A surveillance framework to detect hidden outbreaks was created

Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV) has a high case-fatality rate in horses and humans, and Florida has been hypothesized to be the source of EEEV epidemics for the northeastern U.S. To test this hypothesis, we sequenced complete genomes of 433 EEEV strains collected within the U.S. from 1934 to 2014. Phylogenetic analysis suggested EEEV evolves relatively slowly and that transmission is enzootic in Florida, characterized by higher genetic diversity and long-term local persistence. In contrast, EEEV in New York and Massachusetts were characterized by lower genetic diversity, multiple introductions, and shorter local persistence. Our phylogeographic analysis supported a source-sink model in which Florida is the major source of EEEV compared to the other localities sampled. In sum, this study revealed the complex epidemiological dynamics of EEEV in different geographic regions in the U.S., and provided general insights into the evolution and transmission of other avian mosquito-borne viruses in this region. Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV) infections are severe in horses and humans on the east coast of the United States with over 90% mortality rate in horses, approximately 33% mortality rate in humans, and significant brain damage in most human survivors. However, little is known about the evolutionary characteristics of EEEV due to the lack of genome sequences. By generating large collection of publicly-available complete genome sequences, this study comprehensively determined the evolution of the virus, described the epidemiological dynamics of EEEV in different states in the U.S., and identified Florida as one of the major sources. These results may have important implications for the control and prevention of other mosquito-borne viruses in the Americas.

In order to cause the disease anthrax, Bacillus anthracis requires two plasmids, pX01 and pX02, which carry toxin and capsule genes, respectively, that are used as genetic targets in the laboratory detection of the bacterium. Clinical, forensic, and environmental samples that test positive by PCR protocols established by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for B. anthracis are considered to be potentially B. anthracis until confirmed by culture and a secondary battery of tests. We report the presence of 10 genes (acpA, capA, capB, capC, capR, capD, IS1627, ORF 48, ORF 61, and repA) and the sequence for the capsule promoter normally found on pX02 in Bacillus circulans and a Bacillus species closely related to Bacillus luciferensis. Tests revealed these sequences to be present on a large plasmid in each isolate. The 11 sequences consistently matched to B. anthracis plasmid pX02, GenBank accession numbers AF188935.1, AE011191.1, and AE017335.3. The percent nucleotide identities for capD and the capsule promoter were 99.9% and 99.7%, respectively, and for the remaining nine genes, the nucleotide identity was 100% for both isolates. The presence of these genes, which are usually associated with the pX02 plasmid, in two soil Bacillus species unrelated to B. anthracis alerts us to the necessity of identifying additional sequences that will signal the presence of B. anthracis in clinical, forensic, and environmental samples.Long considered a biowarfare agent, Bacillus anthracis was used in 2001 in an act of bioterrorism. After bacterial endospores were placed into envelopes and delivered by the United States postal system to unsuspecting victims, 22 people were infected of whom 11 developed inhalational anthrax and 5 died (14, 15). As a result, first responders delivered hundreds of thousands of environmental specimens to laboratories across the nation that are part of the National Laboratory Response Network (LRN), a coordinated system of sentinel, reference, and national laboratories established by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (6, 7). Of the three Florida Department of Health (FDOH) laboratories with biosafety level 3 facilities designated to receive these specimens, the FDOH Tampa Laboratory received and analyzed 1,046 environmental samples from first responders across west-central Florida over the last 3 months of 2001. Among these specimens, 19 loose powders or swab samples of powders that were brought in by local law enforcement officers and considered plausible threats initially tested positive for potentially carrying a B. anthracis isolate.Because of the initial positive results, the 19 powders and swabs were cultured and all isolates were tested further using the LRN tests, consisting of nonspecific phenotypic physical/ biochemical tests and specific molecular methods for B. anthracis such as gamma phage susceptibility testing, cell wall and capsule detection by direct fluorescence antibody tests (DFA), and amplification of targeted DNA sequences by PCR (31). After more tests...